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Irregular Migration in Germany  
“Assistance to Return” as Expression of New 
Rationalities of Government 
R U T H  S T E U E RW A L D  
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, ausgehend von Michel Foucaults Theorie der „Governmentalität“, Prakti-
ken der “Rückkehrförderung irregulärer Migrant_innen“ in Deutschland alsTechniken neoliberalen Regierens 
globaler „Migrationsströme“. „Regierung“ wird im Sinne Foucaults als „die Führung der Führungen“ konzep-
tualisiert, und umfasst somit weit mehr als den Staatsapparat. Es wird eine Genealogie von Formen der 
Rückkehrförderung in Deutschland aufgezeichnet, welche sich heute verstärkt auf die Person des_der irregu-
lären Migrant_in beziehen. Diese Genealogie wird dann zu sich verändernden Rationalisierungen von Migrati-
on und globalem Raum in Relation gesetzt. Ich komme zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Einflussnahme auf als ir-
regulär subjektivierte Migrant_innen in einer neoliberalen Regierungsrationalität relevant wird,weil diese den 
freien Fluss der „regulären“ Migrant_innen gefährden.Regulierter freier Fluss reguläre Migrant_innen wiede-
rum ist in einer als globaler Raum konzeptualisierten Welt wichtig, da er einen globalen Markt für Humanka-
pital darstellt.Weiterhin können aktuelle Programme der „Förderung freiwilliger Rückkehr“ als neoliberale Re-
gierungstechniken interpretiert werden, die sich in dasdiskursive Feld der Migration ausbreiten. Dies bedeu-
tet nicht, das souveräne Techniken wie Abschiebung durch diese Techniken ersetzt wurden; vielmehr bildet 
sich ein diskursives Feld des „Regierens von Rückkehr“ heraus, in dem souveräne und neoliberale Techniken 
logisch verknüpft sind und einander bedingen. Eine Fallstudie, die in einer der in mehreren Bundesländern 
speziell zur Rückkehrförerung gegründeten Institution durchgeführt wurde, untersucht schliesslich Regie-
rungstechniken im Feld „Rückkehr“ auf institutioneller Ebene, und gibt einen Einblick in Subjektivierungen 
und Konzeptualiserungen der Arbeit und Zielsetzungen dieser Institution durch ihren Direktor. Auch hier, in 
einer Einrichtung, in der verschiedene (souveräne udnd liberale) Techniken der Rückkehrförderung zusam-
menspielen, dominieren neoliberale Rationalisierungen der irregulären Migrant_innen und der angewandten 
Massnahmen. 
 
Stichworte: Rückkehrförderung, freiwillige Rückkehr, irreguläre Migration, Governmentalität 
 
Starting from Michel Foucault’s theory of governmentality, this thesis analyses practices of “fostering return 
of irregular migrants” in Germany as a neoliberal technique of governing global “flows of migration”. “Gov-
ernment” is understood through Foucault as the “conduct of conduct”, and thus comprises far more than 
merely state institutions. The thesis traces a genealogy of fostering return in different forms in Germany, 
showing that current forms increasingly target irregular migrants. This genealogy is then set in relation to 
changing rationalizations of migration and world space. I conclude that exercising influence on migrants 
subjectivized as irregular becomes relevant within a neoliberal rationality of government, because they en-
danger the free flow of “regular” migrants. A regulated, free flow of regular migrants in turn is important in a 
world conceptualized as a global space, because it represents a necessary global market of human capital. 
Furthermore, current programs of fostering “voluntary return” can be interpreted as neoliberal techniques of 
government, which are spreading into the discursive field of migration. This does not, however, mean that 
sovereign techniques such as deportation are being replaced. Rather, a discursive field of “governing return” 
is opened up, in which neoliberal and sovereign techniques are logically connected and depend on each oth-
er. A case study, realized in one of the institutions founded specifically in order to foster return in different 
federal states in Germany, finally investigates upon government techniques in the field of “return” on an in-
stitutional level, and offers insights into the subjectivization and conceptualizationsof the institution’s aims 
and work practices by its director. I find that within the institution, which is active at the intersection of dif-
ferent (neoliberal and sovereign) techniques of fostering return, neoliberal rationalizations of the irregular 
migrants and the applied measures dominate as well. 
 
Keywords: Fostering return, voluntary return, irregular migration, governmentality 
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1. Introduction 
"Consistent return of illegal immigrants is a constitutive part of successful immigration 
policy.”   
Wolfgang Schäuble (2006)
1
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the current governmental techniques of governing 
irregular migration through “assistance to return” (“Rückkehrförderung”). Using 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality, the central research question is: how is the aim 
of assisting the return of non-deportable foreigners in Germany conceptualized and 
realized, and how has this conceptualization and employment of return changed in 
recent decades. 
“Assistance to return” describes different measures of support to foreigners to leave 
Germany after having spent a certain time in the country. This assistance can be given 
by a wide array of actors. The term can refer to financial, material, bureaucratic or 
other forms of assistance. Many new programs of “assistance to return” have been 
established in Germany in recent decades. Assistance to return increasingly targets 
irregular migrants legally obliged to leave Germany, but whose forceful extraction from 
the territory can for diverse reasons not be realized.  
Governmentality’s theoretical starting point is an understanding of collective thinking 
and the production of truth in terms of “rationalities” as effective in social, cultural and 
political practices (which are termed “techniques of government”) (Dean 1999: 16-18). 
I chose this theoretical approach because it offers the possibility of challenging 
essential givens and of attempting an analysis, which sets observed phenomena in a 
wider context.  
In this manner, current government of “voluntary return” can be interpreted as an 
expression of neoliberal rationalities spreading into the realm of migration and world 
space. Government of return is set at the intersection of different conceptualizations of 
the nation state and world space, echoing different rationalities of government: in 
these different rationalities, movement of persons is conceptualized very differently. 
“Transnational migratory flows” are a neoliberal rationalization. Accordingly, they have 
                                                             
 
1 [K]onsequente Rückführung illegal Eingewanderter [ist] ein wesentlicher Bestandteil einer erfolgreichen Zuwanderungspolitik." (own translat ion) 
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to be comprehensively regulated with the aim of creating and enabling a global market 
of human capital. This is done by employing many different techniques and by acting 
upon many different groups of migrants; non-deportable irregular migrants are only 
one of them.  
Nicholas DE GENOVA has recently spoken about a “deportation turn” in dealing with 
“‘unauthorized’ or ‘irregular’ migration”, with deportation having come to “stand in as 
the apparently singular and presumably natural or proper retribution on the part of 
state powers to this apparent problem” (De Genova 2010: 1). According to De Genova, 
deportation is a disciplinary technique, “premised on [and constitutive in] a normative  
division of the world into territorially defined, ‘sovereign’ nation states, and within 
these states, the ubiquitous division enacted between more or less ‘rightful’ members 
(citizens) and relatively rightless nonmembers (aliens)” (De Genova 2010: 7).  
It can, however, be observed that the fostering of what is called “voluntary return” in 
Germany and the European Union is increasingly presented as a “more humane and 
less costly alternative” to deportation. It is employed to tackle the problem of 
foreigners set for deportation, but who do not cooperate with authorities to identify 
themselves and do not produce identification documents. Deportation has, however, in 
no way been replaced by “voluntary return”, and there are other disciplinary 
techniques applied in order to make deportations possible; a now field of “governing 
return”, logically connecting “forced” and “voluntary” return, has opened up. This 
research will examine this field. 
Government in terms of governmentality is not restricted to the state or enforced in a 
clear top-down manner. Rather, it is something that involves and creates different 
scales, locales, levels, and actors. To analyze government of return, it is thus not only 
relevant to take into consideration official state bodies, but other institutions and 
actors, such as bureaucrats, police officers, the to-be-deportees themselves, etc. Not 
all perspectives could be included in this thesis – most notably that of the deportable 
foreigners is excluded. But I include institutions, such as so called “return centers” or 
welfare organizations in the analysis.  
A word on terminology before I outline the structure of the thesis: From the 
perspective of studies of governmentality, irregular migration and irregular migrants 
are not understood as empirical givens relevant in themselves, but rather as a reified 
object of government that has become relevant due to the rationalities and techniques 
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of government in specific conditions of possibility. It is for this reason that I will 
abstain from employing terms such as „irregularized“ or „illegalized“ migrants, and 
neither set the terms illegal or irregular migrants in quotation marks. In other 
publications (for example Schwenken 2005), these markers are often employed with 
specific aims: to distance the author from political positions that separate rightful 
persons as bearers of rights from persons that are constructed as not entitled to bear 
basic rights in a national space, and only thinkable – and governable – as victims or 
dangerous culprits. I, personally, also distance myself from such political position and 
don’t attempt to justify them; the reason why I will employ the terms irregular 
migrants lies in the fact that I will concern myself precisely with the strategic 
construction and naturalization of the separation mentioned above.  
With this in mind, I will define irregular migrants in this thesis as group of people 
entering or residing in Germany, but (legally) obliged to leave the country. This 
includes those residing on the territory in a clandestine way, and attempting to escape 
any official registration, as their stay represents a legal offence. The thesis is however 
centrally concerned with another group of migrants which I also conceptualize as 
irregular: the group of people residing under a so called “toleration” (Duldung), a 
temporary suspension of the deportation order. This group has access to (reduced) 
social welfare, schooling and medical care, and possibly even work permits, and their 
stay does not represent a legal offence. But if a person is apprehended without papers 
in Germany and cannot be extracted, he or he will in many cases be issued with a 
“toleration”. In fact, both groups are constructed as legally bound to leave the territory 
of the state, and acted upon accordingly. 
The thesis will be structured as follows: Chapter Two will outline the governmentality 
approach in detail and define specific terminology. Chapter Three focuses on the 
applied methods, namely document analysis and expert interviews, and also raises 
some important questions regarding the role of the researcher. In Chapter Four, I will 
elaborate on what I have called ‘changing rationalizations of world space and human 
mobility’, and how those concepts relate to current practices of return. Chapter Five 
and Six will then present the finding of this thesis: After giving an introductory 
overview on the changing governmental policies on migration and assistance to 
(voluntary) return in Germany (and the European Union), the current practice of 
“assistance to voluntary return” will be presented. I will then present a small a case 
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study on rationalities of government in one institution active in fostering return. 
Finally, I will draw my conclusions in Chapter Six, attempting to answer the question of 
how the changes and the connection of the different techniques in the field of 
“assistance to return” can be conceptualized. 
2. Theoretical Background: Governmentality Studies  
2.1 Basic Assumptions 
“Governmentality”, the main theory underlying this thesis, is a term coined by the late 
French philosopher Michel Foucault in his 1978/1979 lectures given at the Collège de 
France. Foucault's thesis of the reciprocal constitution of power techniques and forms 
of knowledge is materialized in this theory (Lemke 2000), with which he attempted to 
reconstruct a “history of governmentality from antiquity to neoliberalism” (Lemke 
2000).  
Governmentality studies make political reason intelligible, by uncovering the 
problematization underlying forms of government. In this process language is seen to 
constitute reality; from the perspective of governmentality, “political struggles [are] 
conflicts over meaning” (Walters/Haahr 2005: 6). 
The concept is based on an understanding of power not as substance: power is not 
derived “from any particular source”, nor is it “founded on itself or generated by itself”. 
The concept is based rather on mechanisms of power as “an intrinsic part of [all] 
relations and, in a circular way [as] both their effect and cause” (Foucault 2007: 2). 
The term ‘government’ is defined in this context differently from the common 
understanding: “the term government is used as a more general term for any 
calculated direction of human conduct” (Dean 1999: 2). Put differently, government 
means “any more or less calculated activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities 
and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge that seeks to 
shape our conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs 
[…]. Agencies of government can be local, regional, national, international or global” 
R U T H  S T E U E R W A L D      
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(Dean 1999: 11). Government then can be directed both towards the self and towards 
others2. 
Importantly, governmentality studies “are not confined to the study of mentalities of 
government, but also include ‘the invention and assemblage of particular apparatuses 
and devices for exercising power and intervening upon particular problems’” (Rose 
1999: 19). In reality, the techniques of power that are central to the analysis of 
governmental practices cannot exist without the rationalities that ‘problematize’ the 
world in certain ways, and vice versa. In this sense: 
“Government defines a discursive field within which the exercise of power is 
rationalized. [...] This process in itself represents an intervention, because political 
rationalities are not a pure or neutral knowledge that merely “re-present” the reality to 
be governed, but represent an already intellectual processing of the reality, from which 
political technologies can start”3 (Lemke 2000, own translation). Considering these 
‘technologies of power’ causes one to question the ‘how’ of government, to examine 
“by what means, procedures, instruments, tactics, technologies and vocabularies is 
authority and rule accomplished” (Dean 1999: 31). 
Starting points for such investigations of the “how” of government are often born from 
“specific situations in which the activity of governing comes to be called into question, 
the moments and the situations in which government becomes a problem” (Dean 
1999: 27). While these moments of ‘problematizations’ are relatively rare, when they 
do arise, they bring into being an opportunity to actually see individual and specific 
rationalities and regimes of power. 
2.2 Genealogy 
By approaching techniques of power as unimaginable without the rationalities enabling 
them, one is further helped to perceive forms of power as exceptional and non-
essential. As Walters and Haahr put it; “words like The State and The Citizen can make 
governing appear like a timeless activity. Yet our political and social actions are always 
                                                             
 
2 This thesis will not fully cover government of the Self, due to the scope and limited access to the research field. I will outline this point in the next chapter. 
3 „Zum einen bezeichnet der Begriff eine spezifische Form der Repräsentation, das heißt Regierung definiert ein diskursives Feld, innerhalb dessen die Ausübung der Macht 
„rationalisiert“ wird. (…) Eine politische Rationalität ist nämlich kein reines und neutrales Wissen, das die zu regierende Realität lediglich „re-präsentiert“, sondern stellt selbst 
bereits eine intellektuelle Bearbeitung der Realität dar, an der dann politische Technologien ansetzen können.“ 
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in some sense dependent upon the existence of certain practices – historically specific 
ways of rewarding and punishing, befriending and alienating, promoting and 
suppressing, etc.” (Walters/Haahr 2005: 14).  
This historical de-familiarization is one central aim of governmentality studies. The 
focus lies on the changes in the subjectivization of objects and subjects of government, 
and in the way the world is conceptualized. The term ‘genealogy’ expresses this 
attempt to de-familiarize history: In a genealogical analysis, the exceptionality of a 
historical series of events is in focus, which does not follow a linear direction aimed at 
a certain end-point, but rather unfolds due to certain “conditions of possibility” 
(Walters/Haahr 2005: 16-17). This does not imply that there is no relation between 
specific historical moments, but does however deny that this relation is causal and 
directed. 
“Genealogy is […] not an exhaustive or totalizing history but a very partial one. It does 
not reconstruct its objects in terms of epochs, or stages of social evolution, but in 
terms of particular synthetic trajectories. The aim of these trajectories is to shed new 
light on particular features of the present by finding their antecedents in strange and 
unexpected places” (Waltes 2002: 562). It is thus not possible to simply localize exact 
counterparts of past events in current ones. 
2.3 Governmentality 
Besides denoting a general approach to forms of government as based on specific 
rationalities, there is a second, (historically) specific meaning of governmentality. 
Governmentality in this sense is used “to distinguish the particular mentalities, arts 
and regimes of government and administration that have emerged since 'early modern' 
Europe”. Within the history of governmentality, “the emergence of a distinctly new 
form of thinking about and exercising power in certain societies” is traced back (Dean 
1999: 19). This refers to specific mentalities of government and related techniques of 
power in the contemporary world “…which can in large parts be traced to Western 
Europe from the sixteenth century” (Dean 1999: 210).  
This historically specific governmentality can be contrasted with other technologies of 
power, which are identified within earlier historical periods, but do not appear 
exclusively within those periods. Against the background of sovereignty and discipline, 
historically specific governmentality is defined as “the ensemble formed by institutions, 
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procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of 
this very specific, albeit very complex, power, that has population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its 
essential technical instrument” (Foucault 2007: 108-109). I will later explain the 
central terms of this definition, after I have outlined the central features of sovereignty 
and discipline, as well as some considerations regarding the relation between these 
rationalities of government. 
2.4 Sovereignty 
One technique of power to be set in contrast with governmentalityis defined by 
Foucault as sovereignty, or “the legal or juridical mechanism”, which he presents as 
having been the dominant mechanism of government from the Middle Ages up to the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Sovereignty is “the system of the legal code 
with a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, and a coupling, 
comprising the code, between a type of prohibited action and a type of punishment” 
(Foucault 2007: 5). This approach takes law, violence and pageantry as its privileged 
instruments, and entails a transcendental legitimization of power that is bound to the 
ruler as the source of power. Sovereignty is predominantly concerned with 
strengthening the sovereign's rule externally, thus sustaining authority over its 
territory: “[T]he objective of the exercise of power is, of course, to maintain, 
strengthen, and protect the principality” (Foucault 2007: 92).  
2.5 Discipline 
Discipline is, after sovereignty, the second mechanism against which 
governmentalitycan be defined. The “disciplinary mechanism” is “the law framed by 
mechanisms of surveillance and correction” (Foucault), which “we could call the 
modern system and which was established from the eighteenth century” (Foucault 
2007: 6). This form of power targets the body: “It operates upon confined spaces like 
the school or the prison where it employs surveillance and normalizing techniques to 
produce useful, calculable subjects” (Walter/Haahr 2005: 9-10) In fact, institutions 
such as the school or the prison come into existence at the same time as the 
introduction of disciplinary techniques of power. 
By this definition, discipline can be considered an intermediate form in the process of 
governmentalization. A range of “adjacent, detective, medical and psychological 
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techniques […] which fall within the domain of surveillance, diagnosis, and the possible 
transformation of individuals” appears (Foucault 2007: 5).  
At this point ‘reason of state’, as the legitimization of power, enters the stage: power is 
no longer derived exclusively from the ruler, and thus from a transcendental source. 
Rather, it is the state that comes to be considered the basis of power. The protection 
of the state against forces that could destroy it, as well as the enrichment of the state, 
stands as the central aim. Discipline is now no longer interested in who rules, but 
rather in how government is exercised. 
2.6 The Governmental Triangle 
It is important to underline the fact that the specific modalities of power outlined here 
– sovereign, disciplinary or governmental forms of power - are all relevant for the aim 
of this thesis. They have neither replaced each other, nor do they stand in a direct 
lineage to each other. Rather, they are all still present in current governmentality. As 
Foucault put it: “In fact, we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental 
management” (Foucault 2007: 107), and: “of course, the ancient modalities that I 
spoke about involve those that appear as newer. It is absolutely clear that [for 
example] in the juridico-legal system […] the disciplinary side was far from being 
absent” (Foucault 2007: 7).  
One ‘technology of power’ can entail several rationalities. While discussing the relation 
between those schematic forms of power, DEAN states: “While governmentality retains 
and utilizes the techniques, rationalities and institutions characteristic of both 
sovereignty and discipline, it departs from them and seeks to reinscribe and recode 
them” (Dean 1999: 18), employing them with a view to govern populations. Still, at 
this point, the specific aspects of governmental power must first be further clarified. 
2.7 Apparatus of Security 
An ‘apparatus of security’ is the main technical means of governmental power. It works 
by first inserting “the phenomenon [to be governed] within a series of probable 
events”. It then, in turn, considers the reaction to this phenomenon using “a 
calculation of costs”, to finally “establish, instead of a binary division between the 
permitted and the prohibited, […] an average considered as optimal on the one hand, 
and, on the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded” (Foucault 
2007: 6). In order to reach this status, government does not attempt to directly 
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“create” or “shape” the object to be governed through the apparatus' of security, but 
rather relies on characteristics of this object, which it “lets happen”, and only tries to 
influence indirectly: “Not that everything is left alone, but laisser-faire is indispensable 
at a certain level” (2007: 45). 
The engagement with these givens, this “reality”, is a central characteristic of 
governmentality; the aim is “to use [the reality] as a support and make it function”. 
Foucault puts it as follows: “the law prohibits and discipline prescribes, and the 
essential function of security, without prohibiting or prescribing, but possibly making 
use of some instruments of prescription or prohibition, is to respond to a reality in such 
a way that this response cancels out the reality to which it responds – nullifies it, or 
regulates it” (2007: 47); other elements of reality are made to function in relation to 
it. 
In employing those apparatus' of security, governmentality thus seeks not fully to 
control, but rather to direct behaviour of the population as its primary target and to 
govern it as a resource. It thus seeks to open up and develop the inside of the state or 
other governable entities. “[It] exerts its power by constituting interior spaces of 
social, economic and political forces as knowable domains, and utilizing technologies to 
manipulate these spaces and their processes” (Walters/Haahrs 2005: 137). In order to 
do so, what is needed is “freedom in the modern sense the word acquires in the 
eighteenth century: no longer the exemption and privileges attached to a person, but 
the possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both 
people and things” (Foucault 2007: 49). This freedom needs to be constantly created, 
and is at the same time constantly endangered by itself. I will come back to this aspect 
with regard to liberal governmentality below. 
2.8 Population 
Foucault understands ‘population’ as a new political personage that in this form did not 
exist before the emergence of governmental forms of power. Population can be 
conceptualized as a new functioning of the relation between the individual and the 
collective, “between the totality of the social body and its elementary fragments” 
(Foucault 2007: 66), coming into effect along with the initial emergence of 
governmental power. Population comes to be considered a natural entity, which can be 
explored and known. The variables of this knowledge, such as climate conditions, the 
laws to which population is subjected, or its means of subsistence, can be set in 
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relation; “statistics, which had hitherto functioned within administrative frameworks, 
and so in terms of the functioning of sovereignty, now discovers and gradually reveals 
that the population possesses its own regularities: its death rate, its incidence of 
disease, its regularities of accidents [and that population] involves specific, aggregate 
effects [...]” (Foucault 2007: 104). 
Due to its “naturalness”, population escapes “the sovereign's voluntarist and direct 
action”, and comes to be acted upon in terms of apparatus of security. Population is 
considered to be possessing desires, which lie outside of direct intervention. These 
desires are considered to produce the general interest of population, under the 
condition that they are allowed to play freely, and are set in certain relations and 
connections (Foucault 2007: 71). 
A range of factors outside of the actual population must therefore be acted upon in 
order to govern them. The aim is not to make subjects obey the will of the sovereign, 
but rather to manipulate factors which are known to effect a population. Population (as 
the object of government) and the actual techniques of government are thus 
interdependent: “A constant interplay between techniques of power and their object 
gradually carves out in reality, as a field of reality, population and its specific 
phenomena. A whole series of objects were made visible for possible forms of 
knowledge on the basis of the constitution of the population as the correlate of 
techniques of power” (Foucault 2007: 79). 
The “Birth of Biopolitics” – the “attempt […] to rationalize the problems posed to 
governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a 
population: health, hygiene, birth rate, life expectancy, race…” (Foucault 2008: 317) – 
can be placed in the context of this development of disciplinary, and then 
governmental, techniques of power. 
In chapter Four, I will attempt to set the arrival of population in the context of national 
state building, and the ongoing subdivision of humanity in national entities, as relevant 
in the context of governmental power. 
2.9 The Governmentalization of the State  
With a view to the aim of this thesis it is important to again underline that, when 
speaking about government in the sense employed in governmentality studies, the 
term government is neither restricted to a state’s [or a supra-state’s] action, nor to the 
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actors within state institutions. Rather, ‘government’ should be read as the “conduct of 
[all] conduct”, undertaken by a range of actors (teachers, priests, parents, social 
worker, detention center employees, activists…, to name some) in a range of fields. 
Government concerns both the conduct of Others, as well as the conduct of the Self: 
In fact, “Foucault maintains that […] there is a certain continuity between the 
government of oneself, the government of a household [economy] and the 
government of a state or community. Linked to this continuity, he argues, is the fact 
that the principles of political action and those of personal conduct can be seen as 
being intimately related. As for the governed, to the extent that it avoids the extremes 
of domination, their government must aim to affect their conduct - that is, it must 
operate through their capacity to regulate their own behaviour. In this respect too, 
successful government of others is often thought to depend on the ability of those 
others to govern themselves, and it must therefore aim to secure the conditions under 
which they are enabled to do so” (Hindess 1996: 105). 
Foucault states an “overvaluation of the problem of the state” in its “unity, individuality 
and rigorous functionality [and even in its] importance” (Foucault 2007: 109). While he 
acknowledges the “presence and the effect of state mechanisms”, he refrains from an 
analysis that begins “with an analysis of the nature, structure, and functions of the 
state in and for itself”, or that starts “from the state considered a sort of political 
universal and then, through successive extension, deducing the status of the mad, the 
sick, children, delinquents, and so on, in our kind of society” (Foucault 2008: 77). The 
concept of the “state” as it appears in Europe from the 16th Century onwards is thus 
not a universal given, but a historical manifestation of changing forms of power: 
“[W]hat is important for our modernity, that is to say, for our present”, Foucault 
states, “is not the state’s takeover (étatisation) of society, so much as what I would 
call the “governmentalization” of the state” (2007): A “movement by which the state of 
justice and sovereign power of the Middle Ages turns into the state of governmentality, 
the population state, the social security state of the twentieth century.” (Walters/Haahr 
2005: 10).  
Historically crucial for this development was the notion that administrative technologies 
of discipline could not compensate for problems arising from population growth and 
food scarcity during the 18th Century. Economic discourse during this period began to 
claim that full regulation and planning restricted economic growth, as, according to 
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economists, economic phenomena followed its own administrative pattern. Therefore, 
rather than attempting to administrate the state as such, the idea of “liberal 
government” was developed, aiming at an individual regulation of purely economic 
processes, while targeting “the conduct of conduct” of the population. Creating and 
securing the freedom of the market by enabling the population to conduct itself in 
concurrence to each other within this space, rather than securing the wellbeing of the 
state through administrative measures, became the goal of government.  
2.10 Liberalism 
The term liberalism in this analysis is read not as an ideology, but as a specific 
modality of governmentality; “liberalism is thus to be analyzed as the principle and 
method of the rationalization of exercising government – a rationalization that, and 
this is where it is specific, follows the internal rule of maximal economization”4 
(Foucault 2003: 1021, quoted in Lemke 2004, own translation). 
Freedom, in this rationalization, comes to play a central role. The concept of freedom 
however, is in turn neither to be analyzed as an “anthropological constant nor [as] a 
historical universal” (Lemke 2004), but as a specific relation between the governor and 
the governed. Thus, liberalism does not guaranty freedoms that exist independently 
from the practice of government. Liberalism “organizes the conditions under which 
individuals can make use of these freedoms; […] it is not a resource, but an artificial 
product of the practice of government” (Lemke 2004: 2). 
By this definition freedom is “the correlative of the deployment of apparatus of 
security” (Foucault 2007: 48) – freedom and the apparatus of security symbiotically 
create each other. Therein lies, however, a fine balance, and freedom as understood 
within liberalism is thus constantly endangered by itself. For this reason the installation 
of ever new “securing” or “stabilizing” mechanisms (Lemke 2004) becomes necessary: 
“If liberalism represents an art of government that basically manipulates interests, it 
cannot do this […] without at the same time managing the dangers and installing the 
mechanisms of security/freedom that guarantee that individuals or collectivity are 
                                                             
 
4 „Der Liberalismus ist also als Prinzip und Methode der Rationalisierung der Regierungsausübung zu analysieren – einer Rationalisierung, die, und hierin liegt ihre Besonder-
heit, der internen Regel maximaler Ökonomie gehorcht.“ 
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exposed to dangers as little as possible5” (Foucault 2003a: 206, quoted in Lemke 
2004, own translation). In other words, the permanent threat is an inherent aspect of 
liberal freedom which has to be constantly calculated in terms of costs and benefits. 
The quest for security and the permanent threat of security are, in Lemke's words, 
complementary aspects of liberal governmentality; “no liberalism without a culture of 
danger” (Foucault 2003: 209, quoted in Lemke 2004, own translation).  
Liberal governmentality thus “consumes” freedom (Lemke 2004). The fact that the 
“free game of powers” constantly endangers the freedom it creates necessitates the 
ever new protecting and intervening mechanisms – the “apparatus of security” that are 
“the downside and condition of existence of liberal government” (Lemke 2004: 3).  
2.11 Neoliberalism 
Towards the end of the 19th Century, liberal governmentality underwent a certain 
shift; neoliberal (or advanced liberal) governmentality came to be fruitfully 
implemented in various environments after World War II (even though its roots can be 
traced back even further).  
Neoliberal rationalities entail a conception (and legitimization) of the role of the state 
as creator and protector of the market. Due to this conception, formerly non-
economical spheres come to be economized. Rather than assuming the “natural” 
functioning of these spheres, though, the market comes to be perceived as something 
that has to be created by the state, and that is constantly endangered.  
State, in this conception, is legitimated because it ensures the existence of the market, 
in which responsible and rational subjects can act. This rationality differs from a liberal 
conception, where the legitimization of the state comes from its ability protect the 
market, but does not derive exclusively from its existence.  
Outside governmental theory, neoliberalism is often understood as the state’s retreat 
from certain policy areas. In terms of governmentality, though, the state, on the 
contrary, assumes further tasks: “The neoliberal strategy consists of shifting the 
responsibility for societal risks like illness, unemployment, poverty, etc., and the 
                                                             
 
5 „Wenn der Liberalismus eine Regierungskunst darstellt, welche die Interessen grundsätzlich manipuliert, so kann er dies nicht – das ist die andere Seite der Medaille – ohne 
zugleich die Gefahren zu managen und Mechanismen von Sicherheit/Freiheit [...] einzusetzen, die sicherstellen, daß die Individuen oder die Kollektivität so wenig wie möglich 
Gefahren ausgesetzt werden.“ 
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survival in society from collective to individual subjects [individuals, families, 
associations, etc.] and in transforming them into problems of self-responsibility6” 
(Lemke 2000: 9, own translation). Freedom, in turn, receives a slightly different 
meaning as well: “Subjects were obliged to be free and were required to conduct 
themselves responsibly, to account for their own lives and their vicissitudes in terms of 
their freedom. Freedom […], as choice, autonomy, self-responsibility, and the 
obligation to maximize one’s life as a kind of enterprise, was one of the principal 
strategies of what Rose termed advanced liberal government” (Rose/O’Malley/Valverde 
2006: 90-91). 
The neoliberal program is read as a technique of government in which “the 
optimization of one's own security becomes at the same time a sign of individual 
autonomy and a societal imperative: it is not only irrational but also immoral to 'make 
it easy for the criminals' and to burden the general public with the (financial) outcomes 
of crime, that are in fact principally avoidable” (Lemke 2004). This is valid in terms of 
the government of the self and the government of others, of communities, states, 
regions. 
In the course of this re-definition of security, surveillance of spaces and opportunity 
structures comes to replace the control of concrete persons and the regulation of 
streams of movements and information comes to replace moral categories such as 
responsibility or guilt (Lemke 2004). In addition, one can also find “a re-moralization of 
social and political discourse […], that claims new forms of social and political 
responsibility for ‘dangerous’ or ‘risky’ forms of behavior, and which depends on 
differentiations between good and bad, friend and foe for the explanation of political-
military or societal interventions” (Lemke 2000: 11, own translation). 
The engagement of governmentality studies with neoliberal practices and rationalities 
can be explained partly as “a response to a particular challenge—how to make sense of 
the transformations in the arts of government that were under way in Britain, the 
United States, and, to a lesser extent, other Western countries. These took the form of 
a sustained critique of the welfare state, social security mechanisms, state planning, 
                                                             
 
6 „Die neoliberale Strategie besteht darin, die Verantwortung für gesellschaftliche Risiken wie Krankheit, Arbeitslosigkeit, Armut, etc. und das (Über-)Leben in Gesellschaftin 
den Zuständigkeitsbereich von kollektiven und individuellen Subjekten (Individuen, Familien, Vereine, etc.) zu übertragen und zu einem Problem der Selbstsorge zu transfor-
mieren.“ 
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and state ownership of enterprises, indeed of the whole apparatus of the social state 
as it had taken shape across the twentieth century” (Lemke 2006: 1991). 
2.12 Criticism and Response 
By de-familiarizing a wide range of very common concepts and categories of social 
research, governmentality presents itself as an ambitious project. At this point I take a 
look at the limits that have been brought forward to this project, and those criticisms 
which have already been identified. 
Rose, O'Malley and Valverde (2006) asserted important criticisms of the approach of 
governmentality. They criticize the approach for being unable to satisfactorily account 
for changes in models of government, and for neglecting the role of “agency, 
experience and resistance in the analysis” (Rose/O'Malley/Valverde 2006: 99). A 
further criticism concerns the approach’s rigid conceptualization of certain programs as 
essentially neoliberal in nature “and to proceed as if this assumption of the particular 
under a more general category provides a sufficient account of its nature or 
explanation of its existence”, to the point that change can exclusively derive from 
“somewhere else”  (Rose/O'Malley/Valverde 2006: 98). 
The authors first trace this criticism back to a general tendency in studies of 
governmentality to treat neoliberalism (Rose/O'Malley/Valverde 2006: 97) as a 
“master category” in the analysis of governmental rationalities and techniques. Against 
such an understanding, the authors bring forward a conceptualization of “[r]atonalities 
[as] constantly undergoing modification in the face of some newly identified problem or 
solution, while retaining certain styles of thought and technological preferences. […] To 
describe a family of programs, strategies, or technologies as post-social or advanced 
liberal should not be taken to imply a necessary or linear transformation of 
government nor (even more problematic) a change at the level of whole societies” 
(Rose/O'Malley/Valverde 2006: 98). At this point I would like to underline that in the 
course of this thesis “neoliberal rationality” and “neoliberal governmentality” should 
not be read in terms of such a master narrative. Even if not explicit at every point, the 
above conceptualization of rationalities is taken as basis. 
Critiques pointing to the neglect of agency in governmentality studies have further 
criticized programs of government as mere ideal types lacking explanatory power. In 
this way government is seen as “a juggernaut that is somehow willing itself into 
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existence, implementing itself into reality by mysterious means” 
(Rose/O'Malley/Valverde 2006: 99). Still, the concept of ideal types misses the point of 
analysis because governmental techniques and programs in governmentality studies 
are not “heuristic devices against which reality is to be constructed” 
(Rose/O'Malley/Valverde 2006: 99), and because analysis does not aim at identifying 
pure types. Rather, “[t]he orientation of governmentality work is not ideal typification, 
but an empirical mapping of governmental rationalities and techniques. Further, there 
is no assumption that the mere existence of a diagram of government implies either its 
generalized acceptance or implementation” (Rose/O'Malley/Valverde 2006: 99). In this 
regard, Rose et al. furthermore stress that governmentality does not claim to be a 
sociology, which is concerned with how programs are implemented and with how many 
subjects adopt or respectively refuse governmental rationalities, but that the study of 
governmentality could well be combined with such work. When I talk of neoliberal 
rationalities in the government of migration, this point should be kept in mind. 
Before this background, and with a view to the genealogical nature of governmentality 
work, the invented and thus mutable nature of governmental thought and technique 
gives a further response to the accusation of a lack of acknowledgment of the role of 
agency in the analysis: “Government is not assumed to be a by-product or necessary 
effect of immanent social or economic forces or structures. Rather, it is seen as an 
attempt by those confronting certain social conditions to make sense of their 
environment, to imagine ways of improving the state of affairs, and to devise ways of 
achieving these ends” (Rose/O'Malley/Valverde 2006: 99). This point touches upon the 
question of how change is explained in terms of governmentality. In this process, 
human creativity stands at the center rather than at the margins of analysis. Human 
creativity is however perceived as both embedded in and starting from available 
resources, techniques and rationalizations. The lack of a framework analyzing agency 
versus structure has a significant effect on, for instance, the conceptualization of 
resistance. The idea of a single movement of resistance is replaced in governmentality 
studies by the idea that a conflict of rival programs and strategies marks the field: 
“[S]tructure almost always implies […] some underlying logic or social force that has to 
be overcome in order that the structures be breached or transformed. Ironically, by 
focusing instead on how those who seek to govern imagine their world and seek to 
fashion it as new, governmentality escapes the cage of structure that itself limits and 
constraints so much of the sociological imagination” (Rose/O'Malley/Valverde 2006: 
R U T H  S T E U E R W A L D      
 
| 22 
 
GET MA WP 06/2014 
100). This account of rivaling programs is in this way not restricted to dichotomously 
constructed opponents, but to a wider field of actors and programs, in which strategies 
dealing with the specific conditions of possibilities – available ideas and material 
capabilities – constitute a crucial factor in the spreading of rationalities and the 
implementation of techniques.  
A last critical point to be mentioned here is the relative neglect of the international 
sphere in Foucault's work, and of the creation of population as subject and object of 
government to the definition of nationally defined sovereign spaces. This point, as well 
as its implication for the internal sphere of a state, has however been raised by a 
range of authors in recent years (for example, Hindess 2004; Walters 2005). Chapter 
Four will be partly dedicated to related considerations. I will therefore not expand on 
this point here. 
3. Method and Subjectivity 
This thesis is to large extent based on secondary literature and document analysis of 
reports and speeches published by a varied range of actors involved in the field of 
migration. These actors include expert working groups implemented by the German 
federal government and European Union bodies employed in illustrating general 
changes in migration government. In addition, I conducted a range of expert 
interviews to gain further insights into the field. The case study employed in the last 
part of my thesis in based on one of these interviews.  
Engagement with governmentality brings about certain specific aspects regarding 
methods of research and work with empirical material.  
Generally, regarding the choice and employment of research methods, it is important 
to consider that programmatic and strategic texts, as well as statistics and other (not 
exclusively quantitative) data produced by the social sciences, are generally regarded 
as expressions of specific rationalities and techniques of government in themselves. 
Such data is considered to be a factor in the creation and structuring of social reality 
and population with its specific traits both as object and subject of government. The 
data should then be acted upon accordingly. This explains widespread practice of 
analyzing programmatic texts of often technical content in governmentality studies 
(Walters 2005: 7). 
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I approach the empirical material I employ in this thesis not as something which 
portrays the world as an essential reality, but as an attempt to portray a world 
according to a specific rationality; as a means of engaging in and acting upon the 
world in terms of a specific strategic project. Importantly, in line with this common 
mode of analysis within governmental studies, I am interested in the formulation of 
programs and the rationalizations underlying them, rather than examining their 
implementation or effects in the first place. 
It is of course rather bold to talk of material produced by social sciences in such a 
general matter and then implicitly take one’s own work – and oneself in the role of the 
researcher – out of this equation, insofar as this present thesis claims for itself the 
capacity to analyze rationalities as if it was standing outside of them. I as a researcher 
am naturally a person with a political standing which directs my way of making sense 
of and acting upon the world. And yet I am attempting to analyze ways of making 
sense of the world and acting upon it as though I am an entirely autonomous agent. In 
order to conduct research in terms of governmentality, this area of tension has to be 
both admitted with its inherent restrictions and endured.  
As further research I have conducted four semi-structured expert interviews with 
persons working within different institutions involved in ‘assistance to return’. The 
interview partners were a social worker counseling for voluntary return (in a welfare 
organization), two officials working in return centers and an expert on the identification 
of non-deportable irregular migrants. I talked to them to firstly obtain information on 
the way these institutions function. One interview with the director of a return center is 
further examined with a view to the rationalities of government inherent in the 
conceptualization of the interviewees’ own work, as I attempted to break a purely 
state-based perspective on the government of return and include different locales of 
government. In this way, I wanted to account for the fact that government is not 
restricted to the level of the state, nor spreading in a linear top-down fashion. 
Rationalities of government are not dictated from a center to then be simply copied, 
they are processed according to specific aims, and thus correspond to differing 
techniques of government.  
The expert concept according to which I chose my interview partners and material in 
general, relates to the theoretical concept as well: Rose has portrayed the “expert” as 
central to liberal form of government:  “Political forces seek to utilize and 
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instrumentalize forms of authority other than those of 'the State' in order to govern - 
spatially and constitutionally - 'at a distance'. They act to accord authority to expert 
authorities whilst simultaneously seeking to secure that autonomy through various 
forms of licensure, through professionalization and through bureaucratization. From 
this time forth, the domain of liberal politics will be distinguished from other spheres of 
authoritative rule, yet inextricably bound to the authority of expertise”, (Rose 1993: 
293). 
The choice of cases and interview partners followed explorative paths; there are many 
actors working in the field in different institutional contexts (state institutions, 
ministries, public advisory bodies to authorities, welfare organizations, etc.). Every 
federal state has its own regulations and institutions on assistance to return; funding 
derives from diverse sources; and the new regulations and publications concerning the 
field are varied, especially in the European Union. There were furthermore practical 
restrictions, as a range of institutions were not willing to give interviews or did not 
respond in time.  
My aim in all my interviews was to understand the following: 
1) What is the central aim of the interviewees’ work and how do they realize this? 
2) How do the interviewees view their own work, and the people who are to return? 
I thus wanted the interviewees to have the opportunity and space to discuss the topic 
without constraints, and so I designed a relatively open manual, to which I did not 
stick strictly, but which I adapted during the interviews to the topics raised by the 
interviewees themselves. The manual included a section focusing on the presentation 
of their institution and tasks, a section in which they answered questions concerning 
their work practice, cooperation with other institutions, successes and challenges, and 
finally a section concerning the self-conception of their institution’s importance and 
role.  
Due to the restricted scope of the thesis and the time restrictions for my research, the 
positions of protest organization or other groups criticizing techniques of government 
in the field could not be included. The same is valid for interviews with police 
institutions and the Ministries of Interior of some Federal States or communal 
foreigner’ offices, which are all involved in assistance to voluntary return.  
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Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, I excluded the perspective of those 
that are governed as irregular migrants. Besides restriction of scope, there is also a 
theoretical consideration in this latter decision: I don’t consider irregular migrants as 
an essentially existing group, but as reified objects of government that are somewhat 
“produced” by different actors’ and technologies of government. This is not to deny 
that the agency and relevance of self-government of those subjectified as irregular 
migrants in the context of the specific conditions of possibility in which they encounter 
themselves (which would be an interesting field of further research). The decision to 
exclude their perspective is based on the decision to focus on the production of truth 
by those that hold an expert status and have access to considerable material 
capabilities. 
4. Governmentalities of International Mobility 
4.1 The Domestic/International Divide as Technology of Gover nment 
In the second chapter of this thesis, I elaborated on the creation of population as an 
object and subject of government with its own reality and specificities to be acted upon 
in governmental terms. I pointed out neoliberal restructuring of governmentality that 
goes along with the “marketization” of formerly non-economic spheres, thereby 
affecting population as an object of government and enhancing the role and power of 
in/security. In the present chapter, I will attempt to outline aspects of changing 
imaginaries of the supra-national sphere that are in effect in the constitution of 
population. By doing this, I want to locate human mobility and specifically, the figure 
of the “non-deportable irregular migrant” in the specific conditions of possibility 
represented by these contemporary rationalities. When writing about trans-border 
migration, and especially touching upon return and deportation, the governmental 
function of the specific account of the international system of boundaries and borders 
is of special importance. 
While it would be wrong to speak of governmentality as a theoretical approach that has 
been per se bound to the national or domestic sphere, it is not wrong to consider 
governmentality as a theory concerned with “specific regimes of practices, rationalities 
and technologies […] rather than with analyses of the development of national 
institutions” (Dean 2010: 229). Contemporary analysis of governmentality is often set 
within the context of national states, within the historicity of these states as entities 
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within a conceptual outside/inside division underlying the formation of population 
remaining unmarked. As William Walter and Wendy Larner put it in 2004: 
“[governmentality] studies have offered an innovative framework to undertake 
empirical research in the modalities of power and rule in modern societies, [but] they 
have nevertheless remained largely focused on political, social and economic life 
'inside' nation states” (Larner/Walters 2004: 1).  
In his studies on governmentality, Foucault himself touched upon the formation of an 
international system as interwoven with the coming about of a liberal art of 
government (Dean 2010: 230), and there have since been other scholars that have 
embarked on work on “international-” or “global- governmentality”. They have in their 
work de-essentialized the differentiation between domestic and international as an 
actual technology of government (for example Hindess 2004; Larner/Walters 2004; 
Kalm 2008; Dean 2010). The national or domestic realm, as opposed to the global or 
international, is in these cases no longer approached as the “analytical locale” 
(Larner/Walters 2004: 5). The international system is rather approached as part of an 
art of governmentality itself (Larner/Walters 2004: 7). 
EnginIsin has also engaged with an “outside view” of the organization of the wider 
human population as governmentality. Isin detailed different forms of citizenship in 
terms of ever new forms of necessary exclusion of non-citizens: Citizenship in its 
genealogy is defined in this case as the capacity of “being political”, and is not 
necessarily bound to the historically specific nation state. Most prominently citizenship 
is conceptualized as a concept growing ever more inclusive – once restricted to the 
wealthy male citizen of the Greek polis, it now includes the poor, former slaves, 
women, and so on. Isin’s rejection of this definition adds to the concept of 
organizations of world space as governmental regimes, the understanding of an 
insider-identity as only constructible via the creation of outsiders7 (ISIN 2002). 
Depending on different imaginaries of the geopolitical world space – and it is important 
to underline that from a perspective of governmentality, “imaginary” means a 
rationalization which is only conceivable in terms of the techniques and practices which 
                                                             
 
7 This is not to say, of course, that citizenship has not been constructed through techniques that first of all targeted insiders; in the aftermath of the 2nd world war, the 
spreading of the national passport can for example be regarded as such a technique; “[i]t promised to produce certainty about who was a citizen and therefore entitled to 
certain rights and benefits” (LIPPERT, 1999:12); but again, the passport was also a technique governing the outsider, the non-citizen, who did not hold a passport. 
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bring it about – the outsider takes on different identities. The government of the 
outsider – on a domestic scale as well as on supranational one – is thus dependent on 
the government of the wider human population in the geopolitical sphere. 
Contemporary attempts to manage international migration can only be understood as 
governmental techniques entailing specific (neoliberal) rationalities, rather than as 
based on universal givens; this accounts for current practices to grasp transnational 
migratory flows as a statistical reality, to differentiate between “good” and “bad” 
migratory movements, to facilitate the good ones and to disable the bad ones, etc.  
This move enables us to locate the government of migration and, in this case, the 
populations governed as “irregular migrants”, as inner-outsiders to be rendered 
extractable, in specific conditions of possibility.  
4.2 Genealogies of World Space and Migration  
4.2.1 State Sovereignty, Citizenship and Development  
Hindess observes the necessary relation between liberal and illiberal practices – or 
security and sovereign techniques necessary in an apparatus of security for the 
creation of freedom – in the emergence and transformation of liberalism (Hindess 
2004a: 28). Using this perception, liberalism comprises the government of those who 
are subjectified as ungovernable through freedom. This is echoed in the 
conceptualization of citizenship as “a regime which operates first by dividing humanity 
into sub-populations” (Hindess 2004: 130), in which each state is “expected to look 
after its own citizens and to be correspondingly less concerned about the conditions of 
those who appear to belong elsewhere” (paralleling Isin’s conception cited above). 
Barry Hindess, in seeking to understand how this liberal principal came to be embodied 
in the state system, and generally, “the manner in which states have come to assume 
such an important place in the government of population” – leading to the existence of 
“numerous domestic spheres” treated as a given in liberal governmentality – turned to 
the 17th century: “[T]he modern state system has its origin in attempts to bring 
religious conflicts in seventeenth-century Europe under control, and especially in the 
1648 Treaty of Westphalia [and] a number of related agreements. These agreements 
effectively transformed the condition of the Western part of Europe, assigning 
populations that had been subject to overlapping sources of authority to sovereign 
rulers which were acknowledged as having primary responsibility for the government 
of population within their territories” (Hindess 2004a: 27). The emergence of sovereign 
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states as self-determined subjects, in whose affairs no outside power has the right to 
intervene, came to be of central importance in Europe.  
Within the imperial area, “the greater part of humanity was brought within the remit of 
the modern system of states either directly through imperial rule or indirectly through 
the complementary and interdependent deployment of a standard civilization, which 
required independent states to acknowledge the extra-territorial jurisdiction of Western 
states, and [….] the 'imperialism of free trade'” (Hindess 2004a: 33). In these specific 
conditions of possibility, “civilization” served as an imaginary of world space among 
Western powers, and the “'standard of civilization' determined whether a people would 
be formally recognized by the Western powers as 'sovereign' and admissible to the 
world society of states” (Walters/Larner 2004: 4). 
During the imperial era the creation of the ‘outsider’ exclusively rested on the denial of 
citizenship. This creation was implemented using the division between citizens and 
non-citizens (imperial subjects). After the spreading of independence and the coming 
about of citizenship as a “universal human condition” (Hindess 2002: 132), it was 
increasingly because of citizenship that those groups came to be governed as outsiders 
(Hindess 2002: 128): “The 'master narrative' of civilization was ultimately displaced by 
ideas like 'development' and 'modernization'. For much of the twentieth century, these 
concepts took on the work of depicting world population and social change” (Walters 
2004: 4). 
With this developmental logic, hierarchical divisions between the ‘citizens’ and the 
‘imperial subjects’ were replaced by divisions between the citizens of developed and 
underdeveloped states, in a world divided not only into sovereign states, but also into 
“stages of development”, echoing the former imperial divisions: “[T]he perception that 
some societies are considerably less advanced than others, and consequently that the 
individuals who belong to them (and perhaps even their descendants in other parts of 
the world) may not yet be fit to govern themselves, clearly plays a significant part in 
the politics of all modern democracies, especially in the treatment accorded to non-
Western immigrants and indigenous peoples” – an aspect very relevant to this thesis. 
“Second, the imperial project of governing and in certain respects improving the 
character of the subject people may no longer be pursued in its original guise, but it 
nevertheless informs the practices of Western states, working now through a more 
remote set of instruments” (Hindess 2004: 197). Larner and Walters (2004) denoted 
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development as “a kind of international welfarism; it seeks to assist the 
underemployed, the poor, and the homeless by addressing problems that are now 
understood as socio-structural”, and not anymore as effect of an essentialized lack of 
“civilization”. 
It is important to underline that “[i]n contrast with imperialism, developmentalism sees 
nation-states as discrete territorial areas, with (virtually) no unclaimed territories. [...] 
It is assumed that the nation-state system is essentially stable, and that each nation-
state has specific geographical, social, and economic characteristics” (Larner/Walters 
2004: 4): Non-deportability could only become problematic before this still valid 
background. 
4.2.2 Global Networks 
While the division of the world into states is still in effect, and developmental logic is 
still very strong in contemporary rationalities of world space, changes in liberal 
governmentality on the state-level, most prominently in “developed” states, have had 
impacts on the rationalization of state sovereignty, population and its delimitations.  
Developmentalism is in demise, just as the legitimization of the state in its capacity to 
present the frame and plan the wellbeing of its population is: Larner and Walters 
compare this to welfare states in many western states, being merely concerned with 
“crisis management”. In this account, development once concerned with progress, 
modernization, and universal citizenship is not associated with such optimistic aspects 
anymore (Walters/Larner 2004).  
The emergence of an imaginary of world space rationalized as “global” (Walters/Larner 
2004), in terms of transnational economic spaces, flows and networks, is an 
expression of a new rationality that came about simultaneously with an expression of 
this “crisis”. This is not to say that the “global” replaced the division of the world into 
nation states, nor is it simply stating that nation states are losing their importance, or 
that other rationalities and techniques of government disappear or are replaced. 
Rather, with the state on a domestic level deriving increasing legitimization from the 
market, and with neoliberal rationalities becoming ever more effective, the role and 
substance of the state within world space is redefined: increasingly, strategic projects 
of (global) neoliberal governmentality, aiming at the creation of a global 
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entrepreneurial society, are brought forward and perceived as at stake. In these 
conceptualizations, states come to play the role of business locations. 
Within this global rationality of world space, the aim of neoliberal governmentality is to 
create a global market and a (world) population that is governed through freedom. The 
supra-state governmental system is marketized in many respects; with actors like the 
World Bank and the dominance of the free market gaining influence, the latter 
increasingly serves as the legitimizing factor for a state to exist. Neither the domestic 
nor the international market is conceptualized as happening naturally, but as having to 
be actively shaped. In this shaping-process, the clear international demarcations 
necessary for the coming about of liberal governmental power and “naturally” 
demarcated national populations and outsiders are re-interpreted and re-constituted 
before the background of a global economy that is “understood as a space of 
investment and trade flows that traverse nation-states.It is a domain in which the 
main actors and dynamic forces are transnational corporations, financial and business 
networks, and other market forces. Progress is to be sought by governing the 
conditions that affect these disembodied processes” (Walters/Larner 2004). The 
subjectivizations of the citizens of those nationally or regionally defined economies 
change; the connectivity to the state of the entrepreneurial subject, which is perceived 
as responsible to invest in him- or herself, changes. Subjects moving in a transnational 
space are re-subjectified in this process; an aspect to which I will turn below. 
Neoliberal restructuring of imaginaries of world space is thus undertaken under specific 
conditions. The division of the world into nation-states, the conceptualization in terms 
of development stages and naturalized national borders are still in effect. Particularly 
inside “developed” states, these rationalities of world space clearly inform and 
reproduce a situation of “complex and hierarchical differentiation[s] of legal status and 
rights for citizens, foreign residents, migrants, and refugees” (LUI 2004: 120). It is not 
a “pure” individual self-entrepreneurial success that accounts for this map of statuses. 
Other rationalities of world space in no way disappear, nor are they replaced. But still, 
an increasingly dominant rationality guiding the map of statuses and the condition of 
the population as object and subject of government can be analyzed as apparatuses of 
security that serve the aim to create, protect and re-create freedom for population to 
be governed, and thus for the market to function. It is not a disciplinary government 
aimed at planning the conditions of population anymore, but selective and indirect 
R U T H  S T E U E R W A L D     
 
 
31 | 
 
GET MA WP 06/2014 
intervention by a range of techniques (among them, possibly also sovereign or 
disciplinary ones), with the aim of governing through freedom standing in the center. 
This change in rationalities may not appear in the same way or have the same effects 
under all different conditions of possibility; within ‘underdeveloped’ states, neoliberal 
rationalities may not (yet) provide the dominant rationality of power. These states 
might derive their legitimization from the mere fact that they do not disturb the game 
of the market8, rather than through their efforts of creating and protecting the market, 
through which they could be externally legitimated by the ‘developed states’.  
4.3 Government of Migration as Global Flows 
4.3.1 Neoliberal Government of Migration 
The above portrayed rationalities, effective in the imaginary of a “global” world, 
correspond to specific rationalities of governing migration. This concept is to be 
thought of in the same historicized and de-essentialized way as the State or the 
International, in order to grasp and embed contemporary government of the return of 
irregular migrants in Germany and the EU – one timeless concept of “migration” does 
not exist.  
A contemporary neoliberal program, along with corresponding global imaginaries of the 
world, comprise the discovery of “a volatile world of restless bodies whose human 
impulses, needs, desires, and capabilities seem to ever increasingly surpass and defy 
the capacities of nation states to define their subjectivities, command their loyalties, 
and contain their energies” (De Genova 2010: 2). It is the above mentioned discovery 
of a new reality of transnational migratory flows, with their own statistical reality, their 
regularities, which is to be acted upon in terms of apparatus of security, as this new 
reality is not governable with disciplinary rationalities. This understanding can be 
distinguished from a rationality of migration as having to be initiated and administered, 
prevalent for instance in the labor recruitment of the 1960s in Germany. 
A moment of threat to the nation state lies in an account of migration as free-floating 
transnational force, due to the role the state has historically come to take. This threat, 
                                                             
 
8 The fact that I have put a neoliberal global imaginary of world space in a genealogical line with civilization and developmentalism before the background of the creation of 
the sovereign state does not imply that here could not be other genealogies that would set contemporary rationalities of the „global“ in a line with other, earlier 
conceptualizations of the global, marked for example by international trade, relations between empires, etc. 
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expressed in the figure of the “bogus asylum seeker” or in “irregular migration” that 
has to be fought, can be explained in terms of freedom endangering itself and as 
having to be acted upon through the apparatus of security.  
At the same time, migratory flows have come to be seen as factors in the creation of a 
free market for human capital in the “global competition for the best heads”, which are 
necessarily to be gained for a specific economic body. This neoliberal conceptualization 
accounts for the newly discovered reality of the migratory “flows” – informed by 
subjectivizations of those transnational entrepreneurial subjects that have managed to 
successfully invest in themselves – in terms of their benefits and necessity.  
On the basis of this rationalization of migration as being necessary for the creation of a 
global market of human capital, a re-conceptualization of the insider/outsider scheme 
can be established. The freedom to move is always threatened by itself (irregular 
migrants are considered as a threat to the functioning of the market), and thus has to 
be embedded within conditions which canceled out this threat: sovereign and 
disciplinary techniques thus come to be employed as integral parts of neoliberal 
governmentality of migration (Lemke 2004). 
Those two conceptualizations of migratory flows – the ones threatening the nation 
state and those governed as free-floating human capital – are increasingly presented 
as an interlinked expression of the free-floating migratory flows from a perspective of 
neoliberal governmentality, that have to be comprehensively managed. There is a 
strategic moment in the way the connection is established; it attempts to defend 
neoliberal rationalities within a field of competition with other rationalities and 
programs prevalent in nationally- and internationally-conceptualized regimes of 
government. These other rationalities comprise a (disciplinary) conceptualization of the 
nation state as both protector and administrator of its citizens, or a conceptualization 
of the state as a sovereign’s realm of power. They also relate to other accounts of the 
international system: The transnational entrepreneurial object of government is clearly 
constructed as distinct from the irregularly moving, underdeveloped and dangerous 
object, in order to enhance the role and acceptance of the entrepreneurial one. 
The account of “securitization” of (inter alia) migration (evoked for example by 
Huysman 2000; Huysman 2006) can be set in the above outlined context. In recent 
years a manifestation of xenophobia against the rising number of immigrants in 
Germany and the European Union since the late 1980s has been observed: Examples 
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of raised emotion can be witnessed in the burning of asylum shelters in the early 
1990s, the increasingly popular view that asylum seekers are illegitimate economic 
migrants, the use of the key-term “lack of integration” as a reason for possibly 
dangerous forms of conduct, the connection evoked between Islam and terrorism, etc. 
The repeated references to the threats coming about with immigration as a group are 
informed by strategic attempts of spreading neoliberal governmentality that relate the 
above outlined conditions of possibility of a world divided into nation states and stages 
of development – now maybe rationalized as stages of market integration. But they 
are also informed by attempts to act upon the discovered “flows” in terms of apparatus 
of security, creating and protecting the conditions for freedom. 
Citizenship as a technique of government also changes with neoliberal rationalities of a 
“global” world. These changes are closely interwoven with the new rationality 
underlying migration and its strategic implementation. Aihwa Ong (2006) comments 
on the dismantling of social rights within a shrinking welfare state in the “developed” 
world. Referring to claims by pro-rights-groups for “postnational, political membership 
for migrant workers”, she has written about changing accounts of citizenship in 
neoliberal governmentality.Arguing that traditional citizenshiphas been transformed by 
market-driven intrusions, she states the following: “[C]omponents formerly tied to 
citizenship – rights, entitlements, as well as nation and territoriality – are becoming 
disarticulated from one another and rearticulated with governing strategies that 
promote economic logic in defining, evaluating, and protecting certain categories of 
subjects and not others. In some milieus, the neoliberal exception gives value to 
calculative practices and to self-governing subjects as preferred citizens. Meanwhile, 
other segments of the population are exempted from neoliberal criteria and thus 
rendered excludable as citizens and subjects. Variations in individual capacities or in 
performance of market skills intensify existing social and moral inequalities while 
blurring political distinctions between national and foreign populations” (ONG 2006: 
15-16). 
4.3.2 Governing Borders 
Another way of setting migration or human mobility in specific conditions of possibility, 
and of grasping changes in the government of migration with view to neoliberalism and 
its strategic implementation, is by referring to specific functions of borders as 
techniques of government.  
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Borders, in a contemporary neoliberal rationalization, come to take over a “bio political 
function” and serve as “regulatory instruments” in relation to population. Walters 
(2002) states that this function has emerged relatively recently, even though “[m]uch 
of contemporary literature on borders takes the association between borders, 
immigration, and 'global flows' of population as though this were the essence of the 
border”. With this shift from a sovereign function of borders – as demarcating and 
constructing the territory where the sovereign rules – to a biopolitical instrument in the 
government of population, it becomes clear that migration or human mobility has not 
always been thought of and governed in the same way.  
Asking how the border became biopolitical, Walters refers to techniques such as the 
passport in the course of the spreading of liberal government; the techniques he 
evokes are essentially all linked with the above-mentioned genealogy of the 
government of world space. He further states that “it is only quite recently that […] 
interventions [in the form of visa applications or border controls] became in any way 
systematic. Contrary to our assumptions about the permanence of borders, and their 
functions, it seems that administrative barriers to migration between nations in 19th 
century Europe were quite minimal” (ibid., 2002:571) – a situation which changed with 
the First World War. 
When considering even more recent techniques of governing borders, it becomes clear 
that the “global” rationality of world space and neoliberal techniques of governing 
migration flows in marketized terms have also left their mark within the governing of 
borders: While borders are de-militarized in a traditional sense and cross-border 
movement of ‘developed’ world tourists and businessmen/women facilitated, new 
means of curbing “irregular migration” are still being implemented. These means 
include technical devices such as body-heat scanners or heartbeat detectors (compare 
Sparke 2006). Such means of detection fit with an increasingly hard-line discourse on 
the risks and insecurity deriving from this group. I will return later to this aspect with a 
view to the specific case of the European Union's Schengen policy. 
4.4 Changing Government of Migration in Germany and the European 
Union 
4.4.1 Rationalities of Governing Migration in Post-World War II Germany 
How are the above outlined theoretical considerations on the changing government of 
migration expressed in the specific case of Germany, and more specifically within the 
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context of the European Union? I will first answer this question before turning to 
“return” and other techniques in the creation of effective deportability in the context of 
governing irregular migration in terms of neoliberal governmentality. 
From the mid 1980s onwards, immigration of refugees and asylum seekers took over a 
central position in the discussion of migration in Germany, leading to the so called 
“asylum compromise” of 1993, that effectively restricted the grounds upon which a 
person could receive protection under political asylum in unified Germany. Accordingly, 
numbers of asylum-applications have since decreased, new objects of government 
rationalized as illegal or irregular migrants have entered the scene, the “problem” of 
uncontrolled migration and the threats related to it have been pronounced widely. A 
wide range of restrictive measures has been implemented to curb what are perceived 
as loopholes to unlawful abuse of social systems. These restrictions range from 
reduced welfare benefits, to special shortened asylum procedures at airports, and so 
on.  
Since the early 2000s however, rationalities echoing a contemporary neoliberal 
rationality of migration have been evoked, and the connection between regular and 
irregular migration entailed in such rationalities has been increasingly brought to the 
fore. Demographic arguments of “ageing societies” and global economic competition 
are employed in favor of legal high skilled migration with reference to these 
rationalities.  
A programmatic attempt to bring forward such a rationalization of migration in 
Germany was outlined in the final report of the 2001 Independent Commission on 
Immigration (UnabhängigeKommissionZuwanderung, UKZ). The UKZ was installed by 
the then federal government due to the problematization of migration-related policy as 
under-regulated and as having an acute need of restructuring (Angenendt 2003: 485). 
The exact proposals which the Commission on Immigration made in its final report 
were not fully realized in the new immigration law, of which the implementation 
process started with the publication of the Commission's report. Rather, the report 
presents a strategic program related to a certain governmentality, which was 
presented by an expert body at the occasion of a problematization of governmental 
practices. Within these practices, and alongside the commission’s rationality, a range 
of programs exists.  
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In the Commission's final report, entitled “shape migration, advance integration” (UKZ 
2001), an understanding of migration as necessary in light of an aging, and soon 
shrinking population in Germany, and due to an “increasingly interwoven world 
economy”, in which competitiveness has to be secured, is dominant. Quotes such as 
“the demographic aging and the reduction of population should be mitigated both 
through an active family policy and through immigration” and “regulated immigration 
of a qualified work force should enhance the offer of the work force and thus contribute 
to the stabilization of the social security system9” (UKZ 2001: 76) hint at this point. 
These considerations stand exemplatory for a paradigm shift after the 1973 
“Recruitment Ban”, which at the time was, and indeed still is, valid, and the then still 
widespread understandings and proclamations of Germany as “not an immigration 
country”.  
Legal migration in the report, in line with the above theoretical considerations, is, 
however, not regarded as automatically benefiting, but rather as having to be actively 
shaped and regulated, with integration being the first condition under which 
immigration can be fruitful. The conditions are to be set for migrants to act as free 
subjects and thus contribute to the competitiveness of the national economy, while 
“expulsion” of “native employees” from the labor market is to be avoided (UKZ 2001: 
73) and the “integration capacity” (UKZ 2001: 68) of the society not exceeded. This 
reasoning, with the underlying conception of a state’s legitimization lying within the 
protection of its “allochthonous” population, echoes other rationalities of government. 
The envisaged system of legal migration is presented as necessarily flexible: “[T]he 
future need for a work force cannot be predicted precisely; it has to account for  
possibly unexpected developments related to supply and demand within the labor 
market10” (UKZ 2001: 41, own translation). The European Commission’s rationalization 
of the world according to specific neoliberal rationalities – rationalities which entail a 
primacy of market logics and an adherence to flexible measures of intervention – 
becomes evident. 
                                                             
 
9 „Die demografische Alterung und der Rückgang der Bevölkerung sollten sowohl mittels einer aktiveren Familienpolitik als auch durch Zuwanderung gemildert werden“, and: 
„Gesteuerte Zuwanderung von qualifizierten Arbeitskräften sollte das Arbeitskräfteangebot und die Erwerbstätigkeit erhöhen und damit einen Beitrag zur Stabilisierung der 
sozialen Sicherungssysteme leisten.“ 
10 „Der künftige Arbeitskräftebedarf kann nicht präzise vorhergesagt werden. Die Kommission empfiehlt daher, ein flexibles Zuwanderungssystem zu entwickeln, das den je-
weiligen zahlenmäßigen und qualifikationsbezogenen Entwicklungen auf der Angebots- und Nachfrageseite des Arbeitsmarktes Rechnung tragen kann.“ 
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In terms of the proposed reforms and changed practices, mostly legal changes are 
proposed. Interestingly though, the aim of the changes in law – a sovereign technique 
- is to create an efficient tool to enable the actors in the labor market to flexibly meet 
their needs in terms of work forces; the current system is presented as “inflexible and 
not doing justice to the realities of the modern labor world” (UKZ 2001: 63). This 
represents an employment of sovereign techniques in a neoliberal rationality. 
4.4.2 Governing Migration in the EU: the Area of Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice 
Before elaborating on changing governmentality in the European Union, I first need to 
clarify accounts of ‘Europeanization’ from a perspective of governmentality. Firstly, this 
process is not considered as a linear, aim-oriented process. ‘Europeanization’ cannot 
fail or lose pace, as the ‘influence’ of the European Union on national policy making 
(and on other entities, such as schools, enterprises, families) represents governmental 
technologies, articulated genealogically in different conditions of possibility. Thus, it 
becomes necessary to question a perception of Europe as a given entity, having 
‘needs’ or ‘frontiers’. In their 2006 book on “Governing Europe”, Walters and Haahr, 
employing a theoretical perspective of governmentality, attempted to “denaturalize the 
Europe(s) within, and presumed by European integration [and] trace out the 
governmentality and rationalities where the ‘how’ of governing Europe is articulated” 
(Walters/Haahr 2005: 18).  
The observation that the European Union has taken over an increasingly strong role in 
the shaping of the government of migration in Germany (and its other member 
states), starting especially with the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, could be read as a 
growing Europeanization of migration policy in Germany; but from a perspective of 
governmentality, something else is at stake. In terms of the interactive processes 
between the self and the local, national and supra-national levels in the shaping of 
government, the European Union can be rationalized as a relatively recent additional 
locale of government; partly expressing new rationalities of governing world-space in 
terms of global spaces and regions.  
In order to grasp the government of migration in the EU, it is important to take into 
consideration the conception of the EU as an area of Freedom, Security and Justice.  
This realm today comprises a wide range of issues and fields. It encompasses 
immigration and asylum; the control of external borders and visa policy; issues like 
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organized crime; drug smuggling and addiction; and so on. In the Treaty on the 
European Union, signed in 1991 in Maastricht, Justice and Home Affairs became, for 
the first time, a focus within the intergovernmental issues of the newly created 
European Union. By then, the Single European Act (SEA) had launched the creation of 
a single market. The neoliberal rationality of this single market redefined the relation 
between state and market, bringing Europe closer to a conception of the market as the 
legitimization of the state’s existence and of its involvement with its population. With 
this rationality, “physical barriers” between member states were increasingly 
“represented not as positive or legitimate practices of social governance or state 
security, but as barriers to the single market, imposing costs on the corporate world 
and a nuisance for European citizens. The objective of removing physical barriers 
therefore emerges as a logical conclusion” (Walters/Haahrs 2005: 60). This aim was 
realized through the emergence and eventual integration into the acquis of the 
Schengen regulations.  
Within this process however, the precise conception of barriers as “external” has aided 
the creation of threats associated with them: “[W]here liberties [are] extended [this 
mentality of government] finds new vulnerabilities. If the line that runs from the 
common to the single market and beyond governs Europe as a space of markets the 
project [of creating an area of Freedom, Security and Justice] will govern Europe as a 
space impinged upon by threats, something resembling a territory” (Walters/Haahr 
2005: 62, my emphasis).  
With the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and the Lisbon treaty of 2009, the Union’s 
engagement in the realm of migration has grown gradually stronger, and efforts to 
protect the EU’s outer borders from being impinged by dangerous subjects have 
become ever more decisive. Fields such as asylum and human trafficking are 
securitized as possibly impinging and endangering the single market in this process. A 
strong element of creating identity and “mediating belonging” (Huysman 2000) 
becomes evident here, albeit along new lines: The law-abiding citizens and denizens 
are created against the criminal Other, mirroring the above accounts of a re-definition 
of the insider-outsider divide, which is no longer to be governed along  presumably 
“natural” national lines.  
These accounts only represent one part of the picture, however; the understanding 
that migration is something that has to be effectively managed is today widespread in 
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the European Union. Allowing legal migration to happen in a regulated way is 
considered one possible answer to contemporary challenges of globalization, as 
keywords like “circular migration” or “mobility partnerships” imply. Thus the fight 
against illegal migration is set in relation to the necessity of fostering legal 
immigration. 
While lacking the space to outline the varied developments and numerous decisions 
concerning both regular and irregular migration regarding this realm of the EU, I would 
like to illustrate the above points by quoting two documents concerned with issues of 
the “Global Approach to Migration”. 
First, I will turn to a paper published by the European Council following an informal 
meeting of European Heads of Government in 2005, where the challenges of migration 
and the actions to be taken in response had been central topics. Before the actual 
“Global Approach” was issued, the Commission had published a paper in which it 
reflected on the contemporary importance and role of migration in the following way: 
“[T]he Commission recognises the need for a coherent, overall and balanced approach 
on migration issues, and the fact that setting up a clear and consolidated EU 
immigration policy adds to the credibility of the EU on the international stage and in its 
relations with third countries. […] While immigration should be recognised as a source 
of cultural and social enrichment, in particular by contributing to entrepreneurship, 
diversity and innovation, its economic impact on employment and growth is also 
significant as it increases labour supply and helps cope with bottlenecks. In addition, 
immigration tends to have an overall positive effect on product demand and therefore 
on labour demand. Migration, if well managed, can be beneficial both to the EU and to 
the countries of origin. However, with increased migration comes the challenge of 
combating illegal immigration and human trafficking […]” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2005a: 2). Within the actual “Global approach”, then, reflecting on the 
increased numbers of migrants coming to the EU, the following is stated: “Action must 
be taken to reduce illegal migration flows and the loss of lives, ensure safe return of 
illegal migrants, strengthen durable solutions for refugees, and build capacity to better 
manage migration, including through maximising the benefits to all partners of legal 
migration, while fully respecting human rights and the individual's right to seek 
asylum” (European Council 2005: 3). 
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The concept of migration management, mirroring such perception, is furthermore 
widely employed by international organization such as the International Organization 
for Migration, whose slogan is “managing migration for the benefit of all”. 
5. Governing Return 
5.1 Governmentalities of Deportation and (Non-) Deportability 
5.1.1 Deportation 
Building on the foundations of the above considerations, which have set the 
government of (irregular) migration in the context of contemporary neoliberal 
governmentality, I will now turn in the present section to considering ways in which 
techniques of extracting irregular migrants have been and are used in terms of the 
above presented contemporary rationalities, in response to specific problematizations. 
These techniques of extracting irregular migrants are a specific cut out of the 
government of irregular migration. In order to do so, I will first call to mind some 
theoretical considerations on deportation, return and non-deportability, to then turn to 
the way in which they take effect through government of return in Germany and the 
EU. 
In the introductory part to this thesis, I shortly referred to deportation as a constitutive 
technique in the government of citizenship as a universal condition of humanity. Within 
this perspective, the widely accepted sovereign right of states to deport non-citizens, 
as well as their duty to admit their own nationals, is treated as a constitutive part of 
the system of sovereign states (as a specific governmental regime) (Walters 2002). 
Approaching deportation in this way, we are able to view it as a very specific technique 
that can be de-historicized when compared to other forms of expulsion.  
Expulsion of humans from a state has historically served a range of aims; people have 
been deported to camps and murdered in masses for belonging to a specific group; 
exiled as a punishment for homicide; transported in groups to colonies as a 
punishment for crimes or from colonies to the main land as cheap labor to be 
exploited; or expelled on religious grounds (Walters 2002). But “while the ends and 
the functions of expulsion have been historically variable, the modern practice of 
deportation is central to the allocation of population to states” (Walters 1997: 267). 
Therefore, an important aspect of deportation is the compulsory concern with the 
destination of the deported.  
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It will be the aim of the present section to determine in what way this “constitutive 
technique of citizenship” is employed currently as technique targeting the government 
of newly discovered transnational flows. This latter question has to be approached with 
a view to the above evoked changing imaginaries of world space and human mobility 
in terms of global flows, in the context of which deportation – in conjunction with other 
forms of extracting “irregular migrants” – comes to be applied. I argue that, with 
neoliberal rationalities strategically changing and rendering more central the effective 
government of migration flows in view of the above described marketized “global” 
rationality of the world (taking into account a world hierarchically divided in stages of 
development), the extraction of the “irregular migrant” as a newly subjectified object 
of government comes to be governed with corresponding new aims: to shape the 
conditions for governing migration, with the aim of fostering and protecting a global 
market of human capital. Deportation (and the related techniques, such as assistance 
of voluntary return) comes to be approached not only as a technique constitutive to 
the nation state, but also to the subjectivization of free flows of migration. 
In this context, I attempt to answer the following questions: Which techniques of 
extracting irregular migrants are employed in the context of creating and protecting 
the functioning market of human capital through the comprehensive management of 
(ir)regular migration (in the specific conditions of possibility presented by the 
international system of states) in the German (and European Union) case? How is 
deportation employed as a disciplinary technique concerned with the administered 
allocation of population to different states?  
5.1.2 Non-deportability 
This thesis targets non-deportable migrants. This group can be read as a specific 
subjectivization of ‘inner-outsiders’, who challenge and endanger the comprehensive 
neoliberal government of migration due to their non-deportability. Concerns about the 
impossibility of purchasing identity documents are, as will become clear below, most 
often expressed with a view to the inefficiency of the governmental regime on 
migration itself (even though other rationalities focusing, for instance, on necessary 
punishment of persons not because they disturb the market, but also because they 
have “betrayed” the state, are also still available). 
‘Inner-outsiders’ residing within a state without legal entitlement to do so have been, 
and still are, subjectified in different rationalities and historical periods, posing differing 
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threats, which are produced and acted upon in terms of differing rationalities. They 
have included “the stateless, the refugee, the German Jew or Russian denationalized 
and stripped of citizenship, the refugees who, in desperate circumstances, have 
destroyed their own citizenship papers, and today the rejected asylum seeker” 
(Walters 2002: 284).  
One important technique in the government of inner-outsiders, applied within different 
rationalizations, has been the camp in its different manifestations; in contemporary 
government of irregular migrants “the detention centers, refugee camps, zones 
d’attente” in airports (Walters 2002) are expressions of this technique.  
Considerations on the topic of the camp often recur on Giorgio Agamben’s 
considerations on the homo sacer (Agamben 2003) as “holding the key to 
understanding the complex place of ‘bare life’ inside/outside the polity” (Lemke 2007). 
In writing the history of the West as the history of the production of homines sacri 
(Lemke 2007), Agamben has set the camp as the place where “the exception becomes 
the norm”, signaling a surplus of bare life for which there is no space within the nation 
state system. Still, from a genealogical perspective of governmentality studies, it is 
important to again look out for the historically specific rationalizations of camps within 
specific conditions of possibility. This is not the place to write a genealogy of camps. 
But just as is the case in the government of the non-deportable, return centers and 
deportation prisons play an important role; these considerations ought to be kept in 
mind. It should, in this context, also be kept in mind that, even if they are not 
explicitly referred to in this thesis, there are numerous other forms of camps involved 
in today’s government’s irregular migrants; for instance those created by the 
externalization of European migration policy to keep irregular migrants from entering 
the European Union. 
Aside from the camp, there have been and there are today many other techniques in 
the government of the inner-outsider, rationalized differently and employed with 
different means: assistance to voluntary return as one of them is central to the present 
thesis. As I will show, this technique is currently presented as one possible response to 
the inefficiency of deportation measures.  
I will outline below the range of techniques that are currently employed in today’s 
government of the “non-deportable migrant” in contemporary Germany and the EU. 
The aim of this outline is thus not to be extensive, to pick the “right” or most effective 
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ones; it is rather to demonstrate the wide array of techniques applied, as well as the 
rationalities underlying them, and, to a certain extent, to look at the way that this has 
changed. 
5.2 Governing “Voluntary Return” in Germany  
5.2.1 Techniques of Governing Voluntary Return 
Turning now to the central techniques in current and past government of “return” in 
Germany, my presentation will follow a commonly evoked line: The differentiation 
between “voluntary” and “forced return”. The boundaries between these two concepts 
are quite blurry in current government of return. This however, has not always been 
the case (a point to which I will later return). For reasons of structure and clarity, I 
have still adhered to it. 
The current system of governing return in Germany is a heterogeneous one, in which a 
range of institutions and actors, including forms and locales of counseling, are 
involved. In line with the above observations of the centrally targeted group of current 
government of return, it is however possible to say that the majority of offers target 
rejected asylum seekers.  
Voluntary Return is not legally defined in Germany, even though the term appears in 
the Residence Law with regard to return centers (compare the next section), as well as 
in the Law for Social Benefits of Asylum Seekers. The definition of “voluntariness” is, 
as implicated, debated in this context: There is no legal or otherwise officially issued 
central definition of the term. Its usage suggests that the “voluntary” in “voluntary 
return” implies that a person is not deported, but for him or herself takes the decision 
to leave the territory. In a good amount of cases however, the deported leaves 
because he or she is obliged to leave Germany – refugees without a permanent 
residence permit are the main target group.  
There are also many cases where the prospect of receiving financial support for 
returning voluntarily is strategically applied to enhance the willingness on non-
deportable irregular migrants to return. Termed “Assistance to Voluntary Return” 
(Förderung der Freiwilligen Rückkehr”), such financial support of return is issued by a 
range of actors, and is often “presented as an instrument of reducing unauthorized 
stay in Germany” (Kreienbrink 2009: 46). Information on possible financial support as 
well as on future prospects within the return country are provided as early as possible 
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and repeatedly alluded to as central to this aim; the to-be-returnee is approached here 
– despite having committed legal offence and hampered his or her effective extraction 
from the territory – as an active, entrepreneurial subject, albeit with a set of strictly 
restricted options. A central rationality underlying the policy of letting ‘even’ those who 
have committed a legal offence by hampering their return benefit from assistance to 
voluntary support, is a cost-benefit based policy. Financial support issued as a one-off 
is a cheaper option for the state than ongoing welfare payments and/or the costs of 
deportation, for which an indulgent migrant often does not account. Still, it is often 
underlined that voluntary return cannot be the only option, because the motivation to 
return would clearly decrease without the obligation to return and the instrument of 
deportation. I will give examples of this constellation. 
Some of the techniques prevalent in governing “voluntary return” and “assistance to 
voluntary return” in Germany have been and still are applied with rationalities and 
aims entailing subjectivizations different from the afore explained, and the focal point 
of the employed measures may lie somewhere else as, say, in the 1960s, as I will later 
demonstrate. My aim is to present a map of current (and partly former) practices, of 
which some are more dominant with regard to this rationality than others. 
The following section is based on the interviews I have conducted, in combination with 
secondary literature as well as self-presentations of institutions. Central sources 
(Kreienbrink/Schneider 2009; Kreienbrink 2006; Schmidt-Fink 2009; Schmidt-Fink 
2006) have been studies published by the German National Contact Point of the 
European Migration Network, a research body established with the aim of providing 
comparable information for EU bodies and local governments on national migration 
policy, as a “contribution to the common asylum and immigration policy” 
(http://emn.sarenet.es/html/index.html) as well as accounts of an “expert meeting on 
voluntary return” related by the Federal Office on Migration and Refugees. These 
sources will be treated as programmatic texts and part of specific rationalities.  
5.2.2 Return Assistance as Development-Political Tool 
The first instance of return assistance policy in Germany was implemented in the 
1950s, when specific re-integration programs targeted foreign students, professionals 
or interns from “developing” countries living in Germany, who were willing to return to 
their countries of origin in order to employ “their know-how for the development of 
their home countries and successful reintegration” (Schmidt-Fink 2009: 2, own 
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translation). These programs were implemented with clearly pronounced 
‘developmental aims’, and exist to this day. 
From 1981 onwards, development-oriented return assistance came to be centrally 
carried out in cooperation between the Central Office for Work Placement 
(‘Zentralstelle für Arbeitsvermittlung’, ZAV; a bureaucratic body engaged with 
international job placements linked to the Federal Employment Office) and the Agency 
for Technical Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ; a 
private enterprise engaged in development cooperation and owned by the German 
Federal Government). This cooperation formed the Centrum for International Migration 
and Development (CIM), which still operates today.  
Current requisites to receive assistance in terms of counseling and/or financial support 
for persons willing to return include holding the nationality of a development country, a 
threshold country or a transformation country, having a permanent residence in 
Germany as well as having obtained a degree, finished an apprenticeship or obtained 
work experience in the relevant country. Such measures strongly echo 
developmentalist imaginaries of the world. Financial support includes travel refunding 
and subsidies to local salary reaching up to €1,600 per month within two years. The 
extent of subsidies depends on the development-political relevance of the respective 
work place, on the country of return, the professional qualification and experience of 
the returnee (CIM, without date).  
The programs have notably never targeted people without a residence permit 
(Schmidt-Fink 2009: 251) – despite the fact that such people might well be otherwise 
eligible for this group, and might be addressed in counseling situations with a person 
with a relevant educational or professional background (compare interview 2, lines 
965-967). 
Nowadays, the CIM presents itself as the “recruiter for German development 
cooperation” and states as its currently relevant reference points: “[T]he development-
political valorization of migration processes”, to which it attempts to “make a 
systematic and impact-oriented contribution” (Bericht 2009). For instance, a further 
program was implemented, which targets German and European professionals to be 
sent to “developing” countries for temporary employment in development-relevant 
sectors (CIM Jahresbericht 2009). This new rationalization of work furthermore 
prompted some central “institutional, structural and operative” reforms in 2009. 
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Among others, the list of priority countries was brought together in agreement with the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation - “[t]hrough the targeted promotion of 
measures in the context of the EU mobility partnerships with Moldavia and Georgia, it 
was possibly to enter the innovative subject of ‘circular migration’” (CIM Jahresbericht 
2009: 7). Looking at the increasingly established connection between ‘migration and 
development’, the nation-based account of development is in constant change – this is 
but one example. Development-related return-assistance comes to be re-rationalized 
as part of comprehensive and market-oriented management of migratory flows, 
though not with focus on non-deportable irregular migrants or unwanted or irregular 
migration in general. When development-oriented return assistance was first 
established in Germany, other rationalities underlay this technique; the world was at 
that time commonly imagined differently.  
5.2.3 Return of Labor Migrants 
From the beginning of the 1980s on, “stronger social and labor policy oriented” 
measures of assistance to return were implemented. The “enhancement of 
reintegration capacities through qualification” was increasingly formulated as a central 
measure, from which migrants would be able to profit whether they were to return 
again or if they were to remain in Germany (Schmidt-Fink 2009: 260). 
In 1983, the “Law for the Enhancement of Readiness to Return of Foreigners” 
(Rückkehrhilfegesetz, RückHG) was implemented. It targeted recruited foreign laborers 
who had become unemployed through no fault of their own or who had been hit by 
short-term labor regulations due to an economic crisis, and it “included the offer […] to 
receive financial return assistance in addition to the refunding of pension insurance 
(employee contribution) and publicly supported building loan agreements ahead of 
time” (Schmidt-Fink 2009: 260). This offer, however, remained valid for just one year, 
until 1984, serving as a clear one-time incident for labor migrants to leave, migrants 
who otherwise might not have done so. Most of those receiving assistance under this 
law held a “special residence permit” for unrestricted residence, which was issued after 
8 years of residence; they were thus far from being considered “non-deportable”. 
Contrary to the above explained development-oriented program, assistance in terms of 
this law did not focus primarily on the impact the returnee would be able to have in the 
country he or she returned to, but was rather motivated in terms of fostering an 
impact on the German labor market. Accordingly, the predecessor of the current 
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employment office became the main actor of this branch of return assistant (Schmidt-
Fink 2006: 260). Contrary to current rationalization of the connection between labor 
market and migration, which aim at the creation and protection of a free global 
market, this law was established as a corrective mechanism to a container-like, 
welfare-oriented national labor market, in relation to which migration played a very 
different role.  
5.2.4 The REAG/GARP Programs of the International Organization for Migr a-
tion 
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has for the last 30 years assumed a 
central role in return assistance within Germany by providing assistance for the 
organization and funding of return, as well as information on the situation in the 
targeted region of return (Schmidt-Fink 2009: 5) – this is done on behalf of the 
German state and is publicly funded.  The introduction of the programs carried out by 
the IOM marked the first step towards return assistance, including actual incentives for 
people to decide to leave Germany, partly even before the introduction of the above 
mentioned law. 
In 1979, the IOM was assigned to carry out the return assistance program 
“Reintegration and Emigration for Asylum Seekers in Germany” (REAG) by the German 
Federal Ministry which was then entitled “Ministry for Family, Youth and Health”. Ten 
years later, in 1989, the “Government Assisted Repatriation Program” (GARP) was 
founded by the IOM on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior 
(Hemingway/Beckers 2003: 137). The programs exist to this day, and are now 
arguably the most widespread programs of return assistance. All of the institutions 
which I analyzed had worked with them. The programs are currently partly funded by 
the federal states. 
Through the REAG program, travel costs are refunded, while the GARP program grants 
initial aid for the reintegration after return.  
For three years during the late 1990s, the programs focused exclusively on returnees 
to the countries of ex-Yugoslavia, who had come to Germany as war refugees under 
temporary protection and had to return once the situation in ex-Yugoslavia was 
considered to allow for it (Schmidt-Fink 2006: 269). This restricted focus was lifted 
again in 2001 to re-open possibilities for travel assistance under the REAG program for 
persons coming from any country. A list of countries determining who is eligible to 
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reintegration support (GARP) is currently reconsidered every year, according to the 
migration-related relevance of the countries. For instance, a group formerly eligible to 
assistance, but taken out of the program in 2004, are Vietnamese contract workers 
(Kreienbrink 2006: 106).  
Assisted groups were redefined in 2006 in terms of status to include all persons eligible 
under the “Law for Asylum Seekers’ Social Benefits” (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, 
AsylbLG). This applies for asylum seekers, recognized refugees and people not holding 
a residence status – thus “almost all foreigners excluding persons that have been 
deported before or that have demonstrably only entered the Federal Republic of 
Germany in order to receive return assistance. Those two groups are indeed also 
eligible to receive assistance under REAG, meaning travel assistance, but not GARP 
initial aid” (IOM 2010). For a short period between 2003 and 2006, there was explicit 
reference to “illegal residents” who would turn themselves in to the authorities; it was 
up to the communal foreigners offices to issue papers for a deportation or to have the 
apprehended foreigners deported. While there no longer exists an explicit reference to 
this situation, illegal residents are still legally eligible as they can, if caught, receive 
assistance under the AsylbLG (Kreienbrink 2006: 106-107)11.This predicament echoes 
repeated accounts of voluntary return as preferable before deportation due to its cost-
efficiency and its humanitarian reasons. This is a central account for the fact that the 
problem of non-deportability is perceived not to be effectively tackled by sovereign 
measures, such as by custody. It is perceived as necessary to open up a field for new 
types of interventions, due to restrictions posed by the conditions of possibility – i.e. 
the international state system, humanitarian discourses and regulations, but also the 
dictate of cost efficiency. Below, I will repeatedly return to this point with view to the 
other techniques in the field. 
Importantly, though, foreigners held in custody pending or securing deportation are no 
longer eligible to return voluntarily, and thus cannot receive assistance. This presents 
one account of the sovereign ‘edges’ of the aforementioned new attempts to regulate 
the field.  
                                                             
 
11 One interviewee recounted the practice that illegal migrants living without registration in Berlin were not criminalized but allowed to voluntarily return and receive assis-
tance under REAG/GARP if they turned themselves in to the authorities (compare interview 4, lines 158-160). 
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One further general prerequisite for assistance is the indigence of the migrant. The 
amount of initial help granted under the GARP program currently varies between 300 
and 750 Euro per returning family member (plus reduced payments for children); 
travel costs are subsidized with up to 200 Euro per adult and 100 Euro per child. 
It is interesting that the German Government entrusted an inter-governmental 
organization with the realization of these programs. In terms of procedure, according 
to one of my interviewees in a return center (interview 2, lines 995.1001), the federal 
government would legally have to deport persons holding means to pay for their return 
on their own costs, without giving them the possibility to return voluntarily, let alone 
subsidize them. This can be avoided if the money is processed via the IOM; in this case 
the returnees can even receive financial return assistance shortly before they leave 
Germany – which is also legally critical.  
A central debate surrounding these programs concerns the question of whether higher 
allowances would enhance the willingness to voluntarily return, without serving an 
incentive for people to migrate to Germany (a fear expressed in the explicit exclusion 
of foreigners having entered the country with the aim to receive assistance). However, 
the investments that migrants make in order to come to Europe in the first place are 
often far higher than any possible financial return-incentives, which is why higher 
incidents are deemed ineffective. Here, once again, the irregular migrant is governed 
as a rational actor and entrepreneurial subject. 
5.2.5 The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and Return Management  
During the course of the implementation of the Immigration Law reform, the Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees, an agency of the German Federal Ministry of 
Interior, was established in 2004 out of the Federal Office for the Recognition of 
Foreign Refugees. Compared to its predecessor, it holds additional competencies 
besides concerning the recognition or rejection of asylum seekers. It also fulfills more 
tasks, mostly regarding the then newly-formulated aim of integrating foreign residents 
in Germany. 
Since 2003, the Office has been responsible for administrating the funds for the 
REAG/GARP programs and cooperating with the IOM in this regard. A “Centre for 
Information Transfer and Assistance to Return” (Zentralstelle für 
Informationsvermittlung zur Rückkehrförderung, ZIRF) was established. This is 
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responsible for allocating grants to institutions applying with specific projects of return 
assistance, as well as for providing relevant information on the topic. For this latter 
objective, a data bank was created including relevant information in terms of access to 
medical care and housing, or the local job market and so on; both relating to the 
specific countries of return. A 2006 project termed “ZIRF Counselling” made it possible 
for institutions to have specific case-related questions processed by the Federal Office 
on request. It was inspired by an earlier IOM run program termed AVRIC (Assisted 
Return Through Intensive Counseling) (KREIENBIRNK). 
It would most likely be the responsibility of the BAMF to develop the national strategy 
of integrated return management requested in the Return Directive. This, however, 
has so far not been undertaken.  
5.2.6 Return Assistance at Federal State and Municipality Level  
Counseling for return has, since the late 1990s, in no way been centralized in 
Germany. However, gaining momentum especially in the mid-2000s, federal states and 
municipalities of bigger cities have started to create funds for return assistance –this is 
true of, for example, Bavaria, Rhineland Palatinate and Lower Saxony, which all 
provide special funds (Kreienbrink 2006: 273 on Bavaria). For Lower Saxony and 
Rhineland Palatinate, the granted amounts are rather flexible, and a specific upper 
limit has not been specified, although the granted amounts do have to be considered 
appropriate by the bureaucrats. Institutions, such as the municipalities, but also non-
governmental institutions involved in counseling, can apply on behalf of their clients. 
In Rhineland Palatinate, the yearly budget of State Initiative is five million Euros. It is 
also possible to apply for grants with the aim to “remove obstacles to deportation”. In 
Bavaria, the money was derived partly from the European Refugee Fund (Kreienbrink 
2006: 273). It is processed through three central Return Counseling Centers and 
targets explicitly rejected asylum seekers, but also other foreigners living on social 
welfare. Besides financial support, the Center can provide material assistance and 
there are also accounts of service structures created in the countries of return. 
In Berlin, the social welfare offices in the districts support recipients who return 
voluntarily in many cases through de-centrally distributed allocations, even though 
there is no especially identified fund (INT).  
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Munich was one of the first municipalities to open up an office for return assistance in 
1996. The project, named “Coming Home” is financed (data from 2006) through the 
European Refugee Fund, the Federal State of Bavaria and the Munich municipality 
itself. It focuses on “humanitarian return” and especially vulnerable groups, such as 
single mothers, unaccompanied minor refugees, and traumatized persons, as well as 
sick and elderly people (KREIE). The Hamburg municipality makes return allowances as 
well12.  
An argument repeatedly brought up in favor of voluntary return is that it causes lower 
costs compared to either deportation or to long-term social welfare dependency. The 
fact that since the late 1990s so many of those at federal state and municipality level 
have come to engage in assistance to return for non-deportable and/or welfare-
dependent (irregular) migrants, was certainly influenced by changes on the national 
and EU level, even though this influence was surely a reciprocal one. A new 
problematic discovered in the government of asylum seekers and (irregular migrants) 
on municipality level, for instance with a view to advancing neoliberal government of 
budgets and welfare system, presents one of the central changes in the field. 
A related case in terms of sub-national initiatives and changes are return centers, 
which will as well be presented below.  
5.2.7 Counseling for Voluntary Return in Welfare Organizations  
Many bigger and smaller welfare organizations have become engaged in counseling for 
voluntary return and in assisting potential returnees to benefit from the above-
presented sources of financial and material support. While some organizations were 
initially reluctant to engage in this field because this could be considered as supporting 
the foreign office in reaching their goal of fostering deportability, this reluctance has 
seemingly eventually diminished. This can be partly explained by the new funding 
opportunities that have opened up for the welfare organizations. Protest organizations 
and refugee support groups however continue to criticize the current practice of 
assistance to voluntary return. 
                                                             
 
12 It was not possibly to obtain information on all Federal States and municipalities of bigger cities due tothe restricted time of research. Thus, the above accounts are not 
complete but serve merely to present the heterogeneity of the field. 
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In recent years, a range of bigger welfare organizations could obtain bigger shares of 
the return-related budgets, as smaller organizations did not have the means to 
undertake the necessary pre-investments that have to be undertaken when receiving 
funds from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. 
The current largest project is called “Home Garden” (“Heimatgarten”) and was installed 
by the Worker’s Welfare Association (Arbeiterwohlfahrt, AWO); one of the biggest 
welfare organizations in Germany. 
Home Garden was developed out of an AWO office’s local initiative in the Northern 
German city of Bremerhaven in 1998. The project has spread to include 12 offices in 
different parts of Germany, which most commonly focus on one specific region or 
country of return, such as ex-Yugoslavian countries, countries of the former Soviet 
Union, Northern Iraq, Turkey and some African states. A recently opened branch 
counsels ethnic German immigrants from the former Soviet Republic, who are willing 
to return but are not eligible under common programs due to their German citizenship. 
Home Garden counsels anonymously. It works both with foreigners legally obliged to 
depart, and with those holding a secure residence status. An initial and ongoing focus 
of the work has been on the elderly, traumatized and care-dependent persons 
(although other groups are also eligible to counseling).  Home Garden offers services 
until up to six months after a person returns, including deferred payments of the 
granted assistance. The practice of deferring is considered as securing that the 
returnees really stay in the country of return and are effectively reintegrated. Until two 
years ago, services were offered for up to two years after a person’s return, but this 
time span was eventually curtailed by the BAMF.  
For Home Garden, these post-return services are considered essential aspects of 
successful reintegration. A network of coordinators has for this reason been installed in 
a range of countries. The coordinators are in contact with the returned persons – 
although one cannot speak of fully fledged care in terms of social work or ongoing 
support.  The reintegration work in different countries has furthermore helped the 
creation of certain institutional structures, such as a home for the elderly in Bosnia. 
The engagement of organizations like Home Garden has, according to its founder 
(Tegelr in BAMF 2006: 33), entailed a shift in the general practice of counseling 
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migrants in Germany, which had for a long time focused exclusively on possibilities to 
remain in the country and on local support. 
Home Garden counsels individually and aims to offer individual perspectives. If, in view 
of such a perspective, a person pronounces the wish to return, the organization will 
attempt to gain specific information on the situation (concerning work opportunities, 
housing, and so on) in the place of return, as well as engaging with different actors in 
order to receive financial support. In addition to the widespread REAG/GARP fees, at 
least 1,150 Euros more are necessary for successful integration. This money is usually 
obtained out of funds raised by the national states. Home Garden receives a fee of 500 
Euros out of the amount granted, in order to cover a part of its expenses. 
5.3 Governing Forced Return 
5.3.1 Techniques of Governing Forced Return 
As suggested above, in contemporary government of migration in Germany, forced 
return is defined in opposition to voluntary return. The question whether or not a 
person is obliged to leave the country is not relevant to this distinction. A range of 
techniques of voluntary return are today implemented as extensions of forced return. 
At the same time, techniques of forced return are criticized as not adequate anymore 
to effectively create deportability and to thus regulate migratory movements. This 
connection indicates a new employment of deportation as a central technique of 
forcefully returning foreigners from a state- as contributing to an effective 
‘management of migration’. 
As I have already outlined, to foster deportability is not the exclusive aim with which 
voluntary return is employed. Neither does this rationality exclusively underlay all 
techniques at work; rationalities employing deportation with the aim of (re-) 
constituting the nation state, legitimized as the caretaker of its nationally defined 
population, prevail – and are evoked strategically. In competition with other 
rationalities, some actors may adhere to such accounts of deportation strategically in 
order to push forward neoliberal rationalities of managing migration as a global flow of 
human capital.  
I will, in the following section, outline central techniques of Germany’s government of 
forced return, taking into consideration the aims with which these techniques are 
employed, and the rationalities with which they are justified. Deportation as a central 
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form of forced return is legally defined in Germany; the law is the main technique used 
in the government within what is conceptualized as forced return, aiming at using 
means of direct coercion. There are, however, other disciplinary techniques that are 
employed in this realm, causing the boundaries between voluntary and forced return to 
become blurry. 
5.3.2 Deportation and Related Forms of Extracting Foreigners 
Legal regulations concerning forcible extraction of persons are defined in Chapter 5 of 
the 2005 Residence Law13. A foreigner not or no longer holding a residence permit is 
accordingly obliged to leave a country. A residence permit can expire, be withdrawn, 
not prolonged or not be issued in the first place, if its preconditions are not (or are no 
longer) fulfilled.  
According to §45, Section 1 of the Residence Law, specific reasons for a foreigner to be 
obliged to depart include the following: Having issued wrong identity information or not 
contributing in implementing the provisions of the residence law (possibly including his 
or her own extraction); having committed an important legal offences; consumption of 
hard drugs; endangering public health through his or her behavior or being homeless; 
and finally, not being able to account for his or her own living expenses and those of 
his or her family, and thus relying on social welfare. Rejected asylum seekers are then 
obliged to leave the country. 
A deportation (“Abschiebung”) is the means of coercion that comes to be applied in the 
above described cases, where there is doubt that a foreigner who is required to leave 
will depart on his or her own account. Public security concerns can also be a further 
reason for a deportation order; since 2005, authorities in the federal states can issue 
immediately enforceable deportation orders without any prior information in the case 
of special danger for the security of the Federal Republic of Germany, or in the case of 
a planned terrorist attack. 
While a deportation can be suspended due to humanitarian and other reasons, this is 
not possible for expulsions. Reasons to suspend a deportation result from a feared 
persecution in the country of origin based on race, religion, nationality, membership in 
an ethnic or social group or political conviction, even if a person has not previously 
                                                             
 
13 For the detailed legal regulations, further compare Hailbronner 2008. 
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been recognized as a political refugee. Risk of the death penalty or torture also count 
as obstacles to a deportation order. A third group of reasons refers to the “effective or 
legal” impossibility to issue the deportation; these can range from nonexistent flight 
connections to lacking identity papers (§60(2)). Effective non-deportability is founded 
on these factors. If a deportation is suspended, a so called “toleration” (“Duldung”) is 
issued, which serves as a suspension of the deportation for a time period to be 
determined by the foreign offices. Usually, certain restrictions concerning place of 
residence and working permit go along with a toleration; in any case, the freedom of 
choosing the place of residence, as well as the freedom to move within Germany are 
restricted (this regulation is called “Residenzpflicht”) for anyone holding a “toleration”, 
and he or she will receive reduced social welfare due to the specific law surrounding 
this measure. 
If obstacles to deportation are expected to prevail into the foreseeable future through 
no fault of the foreigner’s own, an actual residence title out of humanitarian concerns 
may be issued. However, if one has hindered identification or deportation through non-
cooperation, this opportunity is withdrawn.  
An ongoing asylum procedure generally prevents both a deportation and an expulsion 
from being issued. If it becomes clear that an asylum applicant has passed through 
any country defined as a “safe third country” before coming to Germany, though, this 
country is deemed responsible for his or her application under the EU’s Dublin 
Convention, and the person is expelled to that country.   
Deportation (and custody pending/securing deportation) and expulsion are 
implemented by the federal states; there can therefore be differences in their 
implementation. Deportations are mostly undertaken by airplane and are often 
accompanied by the police; if deemed necessary due to the behavior of the deportee, 
they can also be taken into custody of the state. The federal police have issued a range 
of contracts with air carriers regulating possible escorting of the deported foreigner by 
personnel, and regulating medical care, if needed, during deportation flights. 
Moreover, the EU issues coordinated joint deportation flights involving several member 
states. 
Deportation is a sovereign technique involving direct and violent intervention. With a 
view to the wide array of current preconditions for the withdrawal or non-issuing of a 
residence permit, as well as specific problematization concerning its effective 
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realization, the different aims and rationalities with which it is applied become evident. 
They range from concerns of public health to the foreigner’s dependency on public 
welfare, the latter clearly evoking an economized account of the field.  
5.3.3 “Return Centers”  
§60 of the 2005 Immigration Law states that the federal states can create return 
centers („Ausreiseeinrichtungen“) for foreigners whose deportation cannot be realized. 
It further states that readiness to voluntary return is to be fostered in these centers, 
among other means through “care and counseling”. Targeting foremost foreigners 
obliged to depart that have given wrong identity information, actively hampered or not 
supported the acquisition of identity papers and, the measures implemented in these 
return centers lie at the intersection of voluntary and forced return, as they target in 
the first case the identification of the inmates, in order to enable the deportation. The 
staff of such centers attempts to achieve this aim by finding inconsistencies within the 
inmates’ narratives of their life and flight stories. Another way employed by the 
identification of the inmates is convincing diplomatic staff at consulates that this is one 
of their citizens (while this task is mostly realized in cooperation with the Clearing 
Point, to which I will turn below). These measures are exercised alongside the 
counseling for voluntary return and the opening up of prospects for the inmates to 
receive financial and material assistance if they decide to voluntarily leave.  
The return centers are the clearest account of voluntary return being set against forced 
return, and of counseling and assistance being applied as incentive for those non-
deportable irregular migrants that the state are otherwise stuck with to consider to 
return voluntarily. “The restrictions of living conditions […] are to be transformed 
through counseling into motivation for voluntary return” (Kreienbrink 2006: 31), a 
living perspective outside of Germany is to be built up and the lack of further 
perspectives to stay in Germany is made clear. This is why I put return centers – albeit 
with certain reservations – in the “forced return” section of this chapter. As stated 
above, the division itself is blurry; this fact can in itself be considered part of a specific 
rationality of government. 
As the realization of deportations presupposes the existence of valid travel documents 
of a foreigner, the foreigner has to be identified as a national of one specific state, 
which in certain cases is in fact not possible. The reason for this impossibility can lie 
with the foreigner, as well as with the diplomatic representation of the country of 
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return. There are legal obligations for foreigners to identify themselves to the 
authorities and to assist the obtainment of identity papers if they do not hold any; still, 
this can prove partly problematic. To tackle this problem, the return centers work 
closely together with centralized expert bodies that support the identification process, 
the so called Clearing Points, to which I will now turn. 
All return centers in Germany were created in the late 1990s or early 2000s by some 
of the federal states (Lower Saxony, North-Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland Palatinate, 
Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein, Sachsen-Anhalt, compare Fleischmann 2003: 35) even 
before the possibility to create them had been stated within the Law. Except for 
Bavaria, which closed its center earlier this year, all are still in existence. 
If a tolerated person is required to live in a return center, he cannot be issued a work 
permit (although this restriction can be considered for tolerated persons in certain 
cases). The already reduced welfare benefits of asylum seekers and holders of 
tolerations are further restricted to include merely the “irrecusably necessary”, to be 
issued in form of non-cash benefits (usually canteen food, clothing, hygiene articles), 
and the freedom of movement will be even more restricted, so that the person is only 
allowed to move freely in one city. These restrictions however do not exclusively apply 
to those foreigners living in return centers: in theory, a foreign office may also issue 
such restrictions to a person who lives in a normal accommodation for asylum seekers 
and tolerated persons. At least in Rhineland-Palatinate, though, this measure is seldom 
executed, out of cost-related considerations; a tolerated person who is still working 
while living in a municipality does create lower costs for the state. Such restrictions 
imposed outside of a center are often only a last, extreme step to send specifically 
problematic cases to the return center, and thus, restrictions become effective only 
with the referral (interview 2, lines 365 – 268). 
Other restrictions of living conditions in the centers include controlled entry and exit 
searches, and repeated questioning concerning the country of origin, in order to find 
information or inconsistencies in the personal accounts, and thus ideally work out the 
real place of origin. These inconsistencies can concern names of relatives, no or wrong 
knowledge of a country’s school system, but also the inability to find a specific place in 
a city on a map.  
The referral of a person to a return center does not, as is the case for custody 
pending/securing deportation, have to be ordered by a judge, and there is no 
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maximum length of stay established for return centers. There have, however, been 
rulings by administrative courts curtailing the length of stay in specific cases, because 
a disproportionally long stay can be interpreted as aiming at breaking the will of the 
inmates. A significant number of those ordered to live in the centers do not appear at 
all, or disappear after a while (compare interview 1, lines 124 – 126).  
5.3.4 “Clearing Points for Acquisition of Identity Documents”  
Tackling the problem of missing identity documents and the resulting state of non-
deportability by concentrating expertise and country-related knowledge, centralized 
advising institutions have been established by federal police and the federal states. 
Those institutions commonly work in administrative assistance to the foreigners’ 
offices. The “Clearing Points for Acquisition of Identity Documents” (Clearingsstellen für 
Passbeschaffung, hereafter: Clearing Points) are a central expression of such efforts 
that will be further elaborated upon. Central Foreign Offices (Zentrale 
Ausländerbehörden) are other examples, which do not accomplish the same tasks by 
the same means, but have been created out of similar rationalizations. 
Clearing Points work in close cooperation with the consulates of possible states of 
return in order to identify someone as holding a specific nationality, and then to obtain 
travel documents for this person. They also target the to-be-deportees with repeated 
questionings, as those can provide, in the end, the “sole reliable source of information” 
on their identity (compare interview 3, lines 172 – 173). 
The law defines measures to be taken in cases of foreigners not supporting their 
identification: the foreigner can be registered, his or her photographs and fingerprints 
taken, as well as measurements conducted and a linguistic analysis undertaken. He or 
she can be obliged to appear in person in front of the authorities of the state he 
presumably is a citizen of, in order to be identified by them. Not complying with these 
provisions presents a statutory offense. Clearing Points attempt to exhaust all these 
possibilities. Further practices, such as searches of personal belongings in order to find 
hidden documents, can be ordered by the judiciary. 
Presentations of foreigners at consulates or in front of invited delegations from specific 
states can be conducted forcefully, if necessary. They are often realized for groups of 
to-be-deportees who are brought to a presentation together. The representatives of a 
state decide based on linguistic hints, on the consistency of the life story of the to-be-
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returnee, or on the basis of any documents which might exist, if a person holds a 
specific nationality or not (compare interview 3, lines 356/359). Successful 
identifications can’t however outweigh failed ones. Good contact with representatives 
from the side of the German expert is considered an asset. Again, the specific 
preconditions of states are crucial, as some demand some kind of material evidence for 
the recognition of a person as their citizen, or demand the to-be-deportee to sign a 
declaration of voluntariness, which in fact is something the German authorities cannot 
force a person to do, according to jurisdiction.  
Persons can also be deported or identified without having ever admitted to hold a 
specific nationality (compare interview 3, lines 354 – 356); in this case they are 
deported without being identified at all. These practices are highly criticized by 
advocacy groups. In place of passports or provisional documents substituting 
passports, so called laissez-passer documents, issued by the EU are used in some 
cases. 
In Rhineland-Palatinate it is the Clearing Point which decides on the possible referral of 
a person to the return center. The Rhineland-Palatinate Clearing Point additionally 
attempts to clarify the identity of foreigners as early as possible, even while the 
asylum procedure is still running. 
Clearing Points in different Federal States have created a working group on identity 
paper acquisition in order to exchange information and experience. There is a working 
group on return installed by the conference of the federal states’ Ministers on Interior 
(AG Rück), with which the Clearing Points cooperate. In cases where specific states 
lack willingness to take back their nationals, the Federal Government is furthermore 
asked to step in and take diplomatic steps, such as calling in ambassadors or issuing 
demarches. “It was also already considered to allot development aid or reconstruction 
aid in dependency of the willingness to cooperate in order to hold a fiscal measure of 
pressure, though until now without result” (Kreienbrink 2006: 135) 
5.3.5 Custody Pending/Securing Deportation14 
The legal instrument of custody pending or securing deportation was created in post 
World War II Germany in 1965, but applied very little before 1990. In that year, the 
                                                             
 
14 For detailed underlying practices and laws concerning custody pending deportation, compare Kühn 2009. 
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possible length of stay was extended to 18 months, and a “grounded suspicion” that a 
person might attempt to elude his or her deportation was included as a reason for 
custody. In the early 1990s, the reasons for a person to be taken into custody were 
extended and the first deportation prisons built. 
Anti-terror legislation has in recent years transformed the grounds and conditions 
under which a foreigner can be taken into custody. Custody has come to be possible 
under ever weaker evidence of the potential risk posed by a person, and can now be 
issued on the grounds of the newly created judicial fact of “suspicion of posing a 
terrorist danger”. 
Custody can be issued both securing and pending deportation (§62(1) and (2), 
AufenthG/Residence Law). A precondition to the first case is the verifiable prediction 
that an effectively deportable foreigner will attempt to hamper his or her deportation. 
Custody pending deportation can be issued for up to six weeks. If the custody serves 
the aim to secure the deportation, it can be issued for up to 18 months in specific 
cases. 
Custody pending or securing deportation can only be ordered judicially, but this does 
not imply that the asylum process is re-examined. Foreigners that are non-deportable 
due to real or legal obstacles, such as missing identity documents, can only be taken 
into custody on very rare occasions; one provision for custody is that the deportation 
will be realizable in the foreseeable future.  
This is not to be confounded, though, with penal custody that in extreme cases can 
follow the legal offence of not holding identity documents or not supporting their 
provision. While these legal offences are evident for many cases, it is however rare 
that criminal courts pass related sentences, as evidence for a conviction is seldom 
sufficient (compare interview 2, lines 288-299). 
The organization of custody pending or securing deportation lies with the federal 
states, and thus, standards and forms can vary. On some occasions, it is organized 
within the edifices of actual jails, although the inmates are separated from actual 
convicted criminal offenders. On other occasions, such as in Rhineland-Palatinate, 
special deportation prisons were created for this sole purpose. 
The circumstances under which foreigners are taken into custody vary widely. Some 
are seized transiting through Germany without valid documents, while others are taken 
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into custody while working without permission or while waiting for bureaucratic issuing 
of identity documents. Around 90% are successfully deported, of inmates directly out 
of custody – this number is much higher than that quoted by return centers. It is not 
possible to return voluntarily once a person is taken into custody, even though one 
interviewee recounted that this possibility had been discussed politically (based on oral 
information given by the director of the Ingelheim deportation prison). 
5.3.6 Readmission Agreements 
A final technique of government that I would like to mention, with a view to the 
government of forced return, is ‘Readmission Agreements’. These agreements can be 
negotiated bilaterally between Germany and another state (there are currently over 30 
agreements), or multilaterally on behalf of the EU (more than ten, ibid.) 
(Bundesministerium des Innern 2010) 
I have already mentioned that a state’s duty to admit its citizens to its territory, even 
against the citizen’s will, is commonly referred to as part of international law. 
Readmission agreements can thus only serve the regulation of specific modalities of 
this process, in addition to regulating the admission of third country nationals having 
passed through the territory of the respective partner state. A related form of 
international treaty is the transit agreement. They regulate the passage of returning 
persons through the territory of a third state, in order to reduce obstacles to 
deportation and return that may lie grounded in the lack of such provisions. 
A readmission agreement typically contains a definition of recognized material proof of 
a person holding the citizenship of one of the contracting states (this can range from 
copies of expired documents to proof of language proficiency or credible testimonials, 
as well as deadlines within which requests are to be responded to (Regierung der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Regierung der Arabischen Republik Syrien 2008). Escort 
of returnees by members of police forces can also be included in the agreements. 
5.4 Case Study: Rationalizing Return on an Institutional Level  
5.4.1 A Heterogeneous Field, Selective Insights 
After having presented a “map” of techniques in the government of return in Germany, 
and before concluding, I will now turn to look at current rationalities and techniques of 
“assistance to return” employed in one of the above presented institutions: the Trier 
Return Center. Given the heterogeneity of the field which I have outlined above, the 
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insights gained from a single case of course are merely exemplatory and very 
selective. They can in no way be interpreted as giving generalized accounts. I believe 
that the further insight into the field outlined below is nevertheless an important one, 
and that it is indeed possible to extract rationalities out of the account of my 
interviewee. As an “expert”, he does not merely present his own individual ideas, but 
his reasoning is embedded in the rationalities at hand in his working environment.  
To refer to this institution before concluding is also important because, even though it 
is repeatedly invoked that government in terms of governmentality happens not only 
at the state level, regulations and formulations of programs from the state or supra-
state level nevertheless dominate the picture; they easily come to the fore, as they 
can be grasped and documented most easily.  
This section is based on a semi-structured interview I conducted with the director of 
the center, who is one of two persons employed there, working directly with the aim of 
identifying the inmates and increasing their willingness to return voluntarily.  
My analysis of the material was guided by the following questions: How does the 
interviewee subjectify the inmates of the center as well as himself in his work (who is 
to be acted upon)? How does the interviewee rationalize his work (what is to be acted 
upon with what aim)? Which techniques of government are accordingly formulated as 
adequate (How is to be acted)?  
In line with the principles of governmental studies, I am interested in the formulation 
of programs and the rationalizations underlying them; I am not looking at the 
implementation or the effects at the first place.  
I chose practices of “assistance to voluntary return” implemented in a return center for 
further investigation, because the work of the center lies at the intersection of different 
techniques of acting upon non-deportable persons. A wide array of techniques are 
applied as incentives to enable identification and thus to extract the irregular migrants 
from the territory. In other institutions, voluntary return is not exclusively 
implemented with a view to non-deportable irregular migrants, but possibly also issued 
for persons holding a residence permit. In addition, the fact that this interview partner 
spoke about his own role and most openly was an asset.  
I will present the institution in more detail, before then turning to the analysis of the 
interview. 
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5.4.2 The Trier Return Center 
The Return Center in Trier in the Federal State of Rhineland-Palatinate, (whose official 
name is “State Accommodation for Persons Obliged to Return”, “Landesunterkunft für 
Ausreisepflichtige”, LUFA) has existed since 1999. It was created following the example 
of similar institutions in other federal states; they all follow the same aim of enabling 
the voluntary return of persons who were non-deportable because of a lack of identity 
documents, and because they are considered to have hampered the acquisition of 
such.  
Having been initially located close to a deportation prison in another small town in the 
same federal state, Ingelheim, the return center was eventually transferred to Trier in 
order to avoid too close association between the deportation prison and the return 
center, to present the LUFA as a humanitarian alternative to custody: “the impression 
should be avoided, that the LUFA is a kind of instantaneous water heater for [custody 
pending deportation], and thus we said, we want to smoothen the neighborhood” 
(compare interview 2, lines 32 – 35). 
The time the inmates stay in the center varies between a few weeks up to four years; 
there are 76 places. It is located in the same grounds as a reception facility for asylum 
seekers, with which the Return Center cooperates in terms of nourishment and other 
daily supplies for the inmates.  
After this short presentation of the LUFA, I will now turn to address the rationalizations 
of the work as brought forward by the interviewee, its director. 
5.4.3 Rationalities 
Which rationalities underlie the work in the center? Or, to put it another way, which 
reality and problems is it perceived as responding to? Why is the work that is 
conducted in the center considered as important in this specific context? 
The interviewee sees “a waste of lifetime” (interview 2, lines 259) as a central problem 
prevailing in the return center, as the inmates do not tackle their “self-inflicted” 
situation effectively, but passively wait for something to happen that could change 
their situation. The aim of his work is thus to activate these people, and to open up life 
perspectives in their minds. Which perspectives these are – finding a German spouse 
and thus obtaining a residence permit, or receiving assistance to return and opening a 
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market in the country of return – is much less important to the interviewee (ibid., lines 
283 – 287).  
It is thus in his eyes very important that financial and material incentive to voluntarily 
return exists, as motivation to tackle one’s life problems can derive from them (lines 
287 – 289). The interviewee wants to stimulate a concrete idea concerning the work or 
business to be taken up after the return; “This development of perspective is important 
for me, so that the people will have an idea what they will then do at home” (lines 807 
– 809).  
The rationality underlying this perception creates a space of action within which the to-
be-returnee can and is expected to act; he or she has only to be animated to do so. 
The implicit aim is not to get rid of the irregular migrant by all means, but to activate 
him or her and let him or her return (or disappear) on his or her own accounts. 
Still, the space of action is confined by the legal provisions:  “The waste of life time is 
what upsets me most here […], this is something that I tell myself I cannot accept, not 
for me and also not for these people, we have to help them out. One can, however, not 
do it, this is the guideline of the legislator, who says, we don’t want these people to 
enter the asylum procedure if they really come for economic reasons, and we have 
then to put a stop to it” (lines 327 – 334).  
On the other hand, again, the rationality presented by the interviewee does not imply 
that a person who attempted to break legal restrictions has to be punished for this 
offence; instead of a sovereign binary division between “the permitted and the 
prohibited”, clear preference is given to indirect means of bringing about a specific 
result. This result is not the punishment of a wrong doer, but the effective regulation of 
the phenomenon of non-deportability. Thus, voluntary return is considered the right 
thing to aim at, because it is more effective than deportation. 
The LUFA has to defend this specific rationality against other ones prevailing in the 
realm. In this way, many foreigners’ offices are reported as not supporting the fact 
that long term offenders receive financial support after having tricked them for such a 
long time: “[The foreigners’ offices] want them to be deported soon; the option of 
voluntary return is often not accepted. If assistance is issued, it is even more 
problematic to justify this” (lines 215 – 220). In the same way, there have been cases 
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where foreigners’ offices attempted to process the files of long term non-deportable 
persons who then wanted to get married in a deliberately slow way (lines 625 – 630). 
The interviewee furthermore employs the rationality of voluntary return as the 
preferable option before deportation in order to defend the center against critiques 
brought forward against it: “For me, this is the central compromise […] that was made 
[when the creation of return centers was included in the law], on the one hand, one 
said, ok, people that conceal their identity, that give wrong information, will be shown 
that there is now the possibility to create an institution where these cases are taken 
care of intensively. […] On the other hand, it had become clear in practice before that 
the obligation to return can only be enforced if the people are given a chance to […] 
return voluntarily. And one has then […] enabled voluntary return […] for cases that 
were to be deported in terms of the law. So, whoever did not leave the country in 
response to his duty to leave, was to be deported, and now there is suddenly written 
that it is also possible to return voluntarily. […] From this point of view, the people that 
are fighting against this institution and want to get rid of it, as well as of this 
paragraph, I always tell them, think about it, voluntary return is also written there, so 
be careful what you do there, it is our concern here in this institution that people 
return voluntarily if possible” (lines 196 – 215). 
Finally, the fact that the reception center for asylum seekers is in close proximity to 
the LUFA also serves the aim of showing the newly arriving asylum seekers what 
awaits them, if they give wrong identity information, and thus represents an indirect 
attempt to act upon them: “it partly plays, of course, a role that the people in the 
reception center realize, ok, those are people that have to leave due to certain 
reasons, and then also say, depending on their intention, they lied, it’s their own fault, 
or, I was planning to lie myself and now I see what can happen” (lines 1056/1057). 
5.4.4 Subjectivities 
The subjectivizations in the interviewee recounts of course relate to the above 
rationalities: the inmates of the center are subjectified both as insistently obscuring 
their identity, and as rational people able to govern themselves within certain 
restrictions. 
The interviewee recounts that according to experience, the duty to leave the country 
can only be enforced if a person was able leave voluntarily and “with their heads high”, 
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instead of forcibly be deported. Again, sovereign techniques of acting upon the 
problem of non-deportability alone cannot solve the problem; the non-deportability is 
seen as result of the persons’ own choices and behavior, which in turn have to be 
influenced and corrected. “By insisting repeatedly on the possibilities of receiving 
assistance to voluntary return, while we know a person does not really want [to 
return] […], we can then establish an idea within him, or generally bring movement 
into the mental engagement with this idea, which chances do I have […], if someone 
says he has no possibilities in Africa, because everything where he lived was burnt 
down in the civil war or something like that” (lines 290 – 296). The existence of 
possibilities will tackle an engagement with options of behavior, which in turn is seen 
as helping those people to tackle their problems; here, they are subjectivized as able 
to do so – to solve their own problems if they only try. 
These “rational individuals” in the return center are furthermore subjectified by the 
interviewee as “mostly young and dynamic” and thus as willing and able to invest in 
their situation. In the eyes of the interviewee, it is not out of necessity or in term of 
“push and pull factors” that the behavior of the immigrants can be explained, but 
rather in terms of active choice and the willingness to improve their situation: 
“Someone who travels here 4000 kilometers, from Africa or Asia or from wherever, 
even if it is not due to persecution but out of other reasons, is someone who will at 
least make an effort, and a big effort, […] even if he might not have a good education, 
but it is someone who says, I want to improve my situation economically and I will put 
a lot into that” (lines 318 -320). Many people in Germany would not be ready to make 
such efforts according to the interviewee. When these efforts fail, the reason lies not 
exclusively in the actual circumstance, according to the interviewee, but might be 
caused in the wrong or lacking information on what awaits the migrants in Europe, 
which smugglers have given the migrants. 
The conceptualization of the “active subject” is however set in constraints; the inmates 
are also considered as legal offenders, insistently denying cooperation and obscuring 
their identity, as “people who have betrayed the authorities for years” (lines 1029-
1030). Exploiting the inadequate regulations of the authorities’ tough specific 
strategies, it was easy for them to continue to behave in this way; before coming to 
the LUFA, they were used to only having to appear at the Foreigner’s Office once every 
six weeks, and in the meantime were not confronted with the consequences of their 
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wrong behavior (lines 469-472). In the opinion of the interviewee, the inmates are 
conscious about the illegitimacy of their behavior, (“everyone in the LUFA knows it’s 
my own fault, and he also knows of the other that it is his fault”, lines 511-512). The 
options of the rational subject are thus clearly restricted by the legal regulations; it is 
within these restrictions that the possibility to actively better one’s living situation can 
be taken up, and the techniques and objectives of the work in the LUFA are chosen 
respectively. 
The role of the interviewee himself in the return center is closely connected to the way 
the inmates are subjectified; he sees himself as a continuous reminder to the inmates 
that their behavior is unlawful, in the same way a police car continuously driving 
behind another car on a highway would make the driver think about whether or not he 
is driving within the speed limit. Furthermore, he sees himself and his coworkers as 
experts holding specific knowledge on how a foreigner can profit from assistance to 
voluntary return: “Some say, if you have to go there, they will just want you to leave 
[the country], and others say, yes, but they also know how to do it and can help you” 
(lines 940-941).  
5.4.5 Techniques 
Which techniques of government are formulated as adequate to act upon these specific 
objects of government from the perspective of these rationalities? 
I have listed central techniques employed in return centers in the former section: in 
the LUFA, social benefits are restricted to irrecusable necessities to be issued in kind; 
working permits are withdrawn, if they exist; the freedom of movement is restricted to 
the city of residence; and the center employees can have searches of personal 
belongings issued by the judiciary, and repeatedly question them. 
The techniques of assistance to voluntary return implemented in the LUFA cannot be 
treated separately from these disciplinary techniques; they are applied in conjunction. 
This conjunction expresses the subjectivization as wrong doers and rational subject to 
be activated at the same time.  
Ever since the center was established, the Federal Government in Rhineland-Palatinate 
has allocated funds for assistance to voluntary return especially for the inmates of the 
return center, from which they can profit in addition to other available assistance (such 
as the Federal State Government’s general fund of Five Million Euro under which all 
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foreigners can be assisted to return). In counseling situations, the possibility of 
receiving this financial and material support is repeatedly evoked; on the basis of the 
inmates education and his or her professional experiences, the aim is to create a work 
or business plan that can be realized with the assistance. 
This assistance issued especially for the inmates is given out preferably in the form of 
material allocation, such as equipment, computers, or the like. It is thus possible for a 
returnee to receive three times the amount he or she would receive in cash in the form 
of material allocation. The interviewee stated that this latter principle is very effective 
tool to make people engage with possible plans for the future: “It is more fruitful to 
talk about material allocations and its possible use with a person, then about financial 
support that would only be sufficient for the first months” (lines 418-423). 
Concluding on this exemplatory case study,it becomes clear that many of the 
rationalities at work in other locales – at the Federal government, the European Union 
– are processed and adapted to this locale. The interviewee combines the two 
apparently contradictory ideas of the enabling facilitator and the punisher according in 
his own specific method, developing strategies and techniques – it was very often 
referring to his long personal experience that he recounted his positions. In this 
context, it is also especially interesting that the idea of return centers did not come 
about in a top-down fashion, but was integrated in the law after the concept had 
already spread. 
6. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have analyzed current governmental techniques of “assistance to 
return” (“Rückkehrförderung”) in Germany and asked how the conceptualization and 
realization of assistance to return has changed in Germany, to increasingly focus on 
non-deportable irregular migrants. To theoretically embed this research question, I 
have outlined the theory of governmentality and applied it to analyze changing 
imaginaries of world space. In a next step, I demonstrated the influence of these 
changing imaginaries on current conceptualizations of migration. I further outlined that 
contemporary “return assistance” is one expression of the neoliberal government of 
transnational migratory flows, employed with the aim to create a market of human 
capital. 
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Transnational migration could only become an object of government due to these 
spreading global and marketized imaginaries of world space; non-deportable irregular 
migrants are part of this newly discovered reality, under the specific conditions of 
possibility posed by the ongoing importance and interpretive power attributed to the 
nation state as the guarantor of the rights of individuals, and not as a legitimizing 
institution of the market. Thus, I interpreted “assistance to return” as an intrinsic part 
ofthe apparatus of security aimed at curtailing irregular migration in order to enable 
regular migration. 
I then mapped techniques of governing return in contemporary Germany (and the 
European Union), showing that “voluntary return” is increasingly portrayed and “sold” 
as a humanitarian alternative to forced return. In this way, voluntarily return and 
incentives for return have been made available for increasing numbers of groups of 
foreigners and generally given more weight in the government of extracting foreigners 
from the country. 
Other rationalities and respective subjectivizations and techniques of government are 
(still) existent, as well. Development-oriented and labor migration-related return 
assistance are techniques employed (mostly) entailing other rationalities; their aim is 
to govern creating a developed/underdeveloped division of nation states,with reference 
to a nation-state based local welfare regime that is to be protected.  
Contrary to this, the modality of assistance to voluntary return realized in welfare 
organizations, Foreigner’s Offices target the system of governing a specific modality or 
conceptualization of migration itself, with its respective functioning and efficiency. Non-
effective government of return is considered as hampering the capacity of the state to 
create a transnational space in which migratory flows are effectively regulated. 
This aim becomes evident due to the application of a system of techniques, which 
govern the to-be-returnee as a rational calculating subject and aim at setting merely 
the conditions and incentives for him or her to act accordingly - and thus to return 
voluntarily. In specific cases, those techniques are givenclear priority over deportation 
or other sovereign techniques. The number of cases in which this is not an option 
anymore is being reduced; illegal stay, for instance, even though it is still in the law as 
a legal offence, does not imply that a person is not eligible for assistance to voluntarily 
return. 
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At the same time, though, the apparatus of security established to govern return as 
part of migratory flows entail sovereign and disciplinary techniques. These 
techniquescomplementand enable the apparatus. They involve direct intervention, 
custody and violence and are expressed in the existence of deportation, custody 
pending deportation, jointly organized deportation flights, forced questioning or highly 
restricted freedom to move. These sovereign and disciplinary techniques are 
notleftovers of other rationalities of government that will soon disappear, but integral 
parts of the contemporary system. They serve the aim of protecting the freedom 
created in the transnational global sphere for the entrepreneurial subject from 
endangering itself. 
In the interviews I conducted in return centers, there were repeated complaints about 
the restricted possibilities to make people reveal their identity through sanctions; from 
a perspective of governmentality, this standpoint has to be interpreted as informed by 
certain rationalities of government. In fact, it has to be considered a stand point, and 
not a description of reality. 
It is this point that one can take, in my opinion, from this very preliminary study, 
which investigated barelyone aspect of governing irregular migration: 
discoursesimplying a lacking capabilityof the state to effectively deport irregular-
migrants, which are increasingly brought up, are not irrevocable accounts of an 
essential truth, but rather expressions of specific rationalities of government – and 
such is the whole system of extracting those who are subjectivized as irregular and, as 
I said in the Introduction,seen as only governable as victims or dangerous 
culprits.Bearing this denaturalization in mind and perceiving the system as a 
historically specific apparatus having come about in specific conditions of possibility, 
one is enabled to think ahead: it is not the only possible rationality to violently act 
upon some in order to enable the freedom of others. 
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